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Notes
Allocating Copyright Liability to Telecommunications
Common Carriers Supplying Cable Systems
Telecommunications common carrier' licenses issued by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) make it pos-
sible for an intermediate common carrier 2 to intercept, without
permission, the signal of a traditional commercial television
broadcasting station and transmit that signal via satellite or ter-
1. Telecommunications common carriers, regulated by the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1976), are
quasi-public entities that must offer their services indiscriminately to the pub-
lic regardless of who owns the communications facilities involved. See, e.g.,
American Tel. & TeL Co. v. F.C.C., 572 F.2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1978). There are basi-
cally two types of intermediate common carriers that supply television signals
to cable systems. A miscellaneous common carrier (MCC) owns microwave re-
lay facilities. Its main service is providing one-way terrestrial transmission of
television signals for the benefit of cable television systems, although it may
also serve television broadcast stations or business users requiring point-to-
point transmissions. MCCs generally are small entities that operate regionally,
receiving a television signal from a broadcast station and relaying the signal via
microwave relay facilities, spaced at twenty to thirty mile intervals, to a
number of smaller, distant communities. See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking,
77 F.C.C.2d 308, 321 (1979).
A resale common carrier is a kind of hybrid common carrier. Rather than
owning its communications facilities, a resale carrier leases the communica-
tions service and facilities of another entity (the underlying carrier) and then
reoffers communications services to the public, with or without "adding value,"
for profit. See id. at 320-21; Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared
Use of Common Carrier Serv. & Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 271 (1976). The FCC
prohibits satellite resale carriers from being "substantially involved in the pro-
duction of, the writing of; the selection of, or ... influencing the content of any
information to be transmitted over its facilities." Southern Satellite Systems,
Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 162 (1976). Nor may they transmit to affiliated entities. Id.
Although the customers for resale carrier services may be any unaffiliated
entity needing specialized resale carriage, in practice the customers have been
almost exclusively cable television systems. For example, Southern Satellite
Systems (SSS) became a satellite resale common carrier by leasing transpon-
der facilities on RCA Americom's SATCOM I domestic satellite, the underlying
carrier, to provide point to multipoint relay of television broadcast signals to
widely dispersed cable television systems that owned or leased satellite re-
ceive-only terrestrial stations. Id. at 154.
This Note uses the term "intermediate carriers" to describe the video relay
services of both miscellaneous and resale common carriers supplying cable
systems.
2. See supra note 1.
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restrial microwave relay, without alteration, to distant cable
systems. 3 By using satellites for multipoint distribution of tele-
vision signals, certain intermediate carriers 4 enable cable sta-
tions to import distant signals at low cost, and thus permit
cable stations to receive "superstation" 5 programming that
would be unavailable if cable station owners had to rely on
costly terrestrial microwave transmissions. 6 The expansion in
this distant signal programming has contributed significantly to
the current explosive growth of cable television systems. 7
Although the increase in the supply of distant signals has
fueled the expansion of the cable television industry, this ex-
pansion has not been without adverse effects. The proliferation
of distant signal programming, for example, has altered the
competitive positions of program suppliers and local television
broadcasters. Distant signal programming depletes local sta-
tions' revenues by diverting part of the local audience to cable
stations providing distant signal programming comparable to
that of local broadcasters.8 Similarly, program suppliers are
3. See, e.g., Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 162 (1976).
4. See supra note 1.
5. The term "superstation" refers to a broadcast station whose signal is
retransmitted either by microwave transmission or by a satellite resale carrier
to viewers beyond that station's normal viewing area. Josiah, The Superstation
and the Doctrine of Localism, 3 CoM. & L., Fall, 1981, at 3, 3.
The FCC has licensed resale carriers to distribute seven broadcasting sta-
tions by satellite. Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 320 n.18
(1979). Of those licensed, not all are in operation. Distribution of KTIV-Los
Angeles, for example, has been delayed pending resolution of a petition by Me-
tromedia, Inc., KTTV's owner, for a rehearing of the FCC's grant of authority to
ASN, Inc., to act as resale carrier for transmission of KTTV's signal. See Brot-
man, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the Marketplace Model
2 CoM. ENr. 477, 484 (1980). Not all superstations are pleased with their status,
because satellite distribution often runs counter to their interests. For exam-
ple, the NCAA recently refused to sell WGN-Chicago the rights to cover two
college basketball games because WGN's superstation distribution would have
undermined the NCAA's ability to sell the games to stations in other markets.
Thus, WGN is known as an "unwilling" superstation. Id. at 481-82. Only Ted
Turner's station, WTBS-Atlanta, is clearly a willing superstation. Turner ac-
tively promotes WTBS's superstation status, airing programs with a broad na-
tional appeal and attracting nationwide advertisers. Montgomery, An Atlanta
TV Outlet Seeks to Blanket U.S., Get Ad Rates to Match, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1979,
at 1, col. 1. Turner's practice appears to run afoul of the FCC's "doctrine of lo-
calism." See generally Josiah, supra.
6. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
8. "Cable television ('CATV') systems pose a competitive threat to con-
ventional over-the-air stations because their importation of distant signals may
divert viewers who otherwise would watch local stations. This danger is partic-
ularly great where the imported signals merely duplicate the programming ap-
pearing on the local stations .... " Kiro, Inc. v. F.C.C., 631 F.2d 900, 901 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). See also Note, The Collapse of Consensus: Effects of the Deregulation
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undercompensated for their programs' syndication values, be-
cause their programs are distributed in unanticipated ways.9
Before the development of satellite technology and the dis-
tribution of distant signal programming in the late 1970's, a deli-
cate balance was maintained among the interests of program
suppliers, local television broadcasters, and cable stations pri-
marily through two constraints: FCC regulationsl0 and the 1976
Copyright Act (the Act)." These administrative and legislative
constraints were designed to protect the economic interests of
program suppliers and broadcasters, while simultaneously en-
couraging the dissemination of as many and varied programs as
possible through cable systems.12 Because of FCC deregula-
tion and changes in retransmission technology, however, the
balance of interests has shifted perceptively in favor of the in-
of Cable Television, 81 CoLuM. L. REV. 612, 612 (1981); infra note 197 and accom-
panying text.
9. Program suppliers are paid by nonnetwork television stations in an
amount representing the syndication value of the program to the local station.
When the viewer market expands, of course, the program's syndication value
increases. See NETWORK INQUiRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMM'N, PRELIMINARY REPORT, AN ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION PROGRAM PRODUC-
TION, ACQUISITION & DISTRIBUTION 143-44 (1980). In the distant signal context,
however, a third party creates the expanded viewer market resulting from sat-
ellite retransmission, and thus the local station may be unwilling or unable to
pay the program supplier for the program's increased syndication value when
the local television station generally derives little or no benefit from the ex-
panded market. Although it might be possible for local stations transformed
into superstations to capitalize on the expanded viewer market by selling re-
gional or national advertising, and thus pay syndicators a higher fee based on
increased advertising revenues, this may not occur. Local advertisers are often
interested only in the local viewer market, and regional or national advertisers
may find the superstation's distant viewer market too amorphous to assign it
its full value. But see infra text following note 210.
To the extent that superstations become additional signals carried by cable
stations, of course, program suppliers derive some benefit from the expanded
viewer market. Under the Copyright Act's compulsory license scheme, cable
stations pay a limited copyright royalty, based on the number of distant signals
carried, to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, which distributes funds from this
pool to program suppliers. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. This
compulsory royalty payment, of course, does not reflect the syndication value
of the program to its supplier. See infra note 69.
10. The first comprehensive regulatory scheme involving cable systems
was instituted in 1965. See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683,
716-741 (1965). Five basic sets of rules were promulgated by the FCC between
1965 and 1980. For a discussion of the most recent of these regulations, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 75-86.
11. Pub. L No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981)). Section 111 contains the provisions relevant to cable
systems. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. V 1981). See generally Greene, The Cable Tele-
vision Provisions of the Revised Copyright Ac 27 CAm. U.L. REV. 263 (1976);
infra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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terests of cable stations at the expense of the interests of pro-
gram suppliers and local broadcasters. 3 Unless changes are
made, this disparity is likely to increase in the near future.
Short of promulgating new FCC regulations,' 4 the only way to
correct the current imbalance is to reallocate copyright liability
in the secondary transmissions' 5 market.
This Note considers the impact of intermediate telecommu-
nications carriers in the current secondary transmissions mar-
ket and discusses their proper role in a secondary
transmissions copyright scheme that advances broad copyright
and communications policies. Part I offers a brief overview of
intermediate carrier technology and a description of adminis-
trative and legislative restrictions affecting secondary transmis-
sions, including those made by cable systems and intermediate
carriers. This discussion is followed by an analysis of how re-
cent administrative changes and application of the new copy-
right law have affected the communications industry. Part II
considers why intermediate carriers have not been subjected to
copyright liability. This Part includes an analysis of two recent
federal appellate court cases and a critical assessment of argu-
ments relating to the applicability of the Copyright Act's pas-
sive carrier exemption to intermediate carriers importing
distant signals. Part III evaluates the effect of imposing copy-
right liability on distant signal retransmissions in the context of
current market and regulatory conditions. This Part concludes
that altering the current copyright scheme to allocate initial
copyright liability to intermediate carriers importing distant
signals advances broad copyright and communications policies.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF DISTANT SIGNAL TECHNOLOGY
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
CONTROLS IN THE SECONDARY
TRANSMISSIONS MARKET
A. OVERVIEw OF DISTANT SIGNAL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS ROLE
WITHIN THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY
Before satellites began supplying cable television systems
with distant programming, the FCC quite properly viewed
13. See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the FCC's inability to solve the problems associated
with cable television, see Note, Regulatory Versus Property Rights Solutions for
the Cable Television Problem, 69 CALiF. L. REv. 527, 536-45 (1981).
15. Secondary transmissions generally are those other than the original
broadcast transmissions. See infra note 62.
[Vol. 67:963
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cable systems as primarily a supplementary communications
service aiding audience reception of local commercial television
broadcasts.16 The first community antenna television stations
(CATVs, commonly known as cable television stations)'?
served primarily to extend the range of VBF18 stations into
communities that were situated beyond the normal broadcast-
ing range of such stations, or which, because of their topogra-
phy, were ill suited for the reception of over-the-air' 9
broadcasts. 20 Early cable systems that wished to import dis-
tant signals relied on a system of terrestrial microwave repeat-
ers to relay the signals.21 Because microwaves travel in
straight lines and are blocked by solid objects, they must be re-
layed by line-of-sight repeaters spaced at intervals of about
twenty-five miles.22 Therefore, it would not have been economi-
cally feasible for a California cable system, for example, to im-
port the signal of a New York broadcast station by this method.
In contrast, the cost of sending broadcast signals via do-
mestic satellite to scattered cable stations is largely not a func-
tion of distance. An antenna situated near the commercial
television station picks up the broadcast signal off the air2 3 and
16. See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 705 (1965).
17. The first cable television station was established on a noncommercial
basis in Astoria, Oregon in 1949. M1onRnT STAFF OF HOUSE SUBcoMm. ON TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON EN-
ERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
IN TRANSrrION 250 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as MAJORrrY STAFF RE-
PORT]. One year later, the first commercial cable television station was created
in Lansford, Pennsylvania. See id. Community Antenna Television derived its
name from its function of serving remote communities like Lansford and Asto-
ria. See id.
18. "VHF" stands for "very-high frequency." VHF stations occupy chan-
nels 2 through 13 on the television dial.
19. "Over-the-air" broadcasting refers to traditional commercial television
broadcasting where signals are picked up "off-the-air" by the typical home
viewer's roof-top antenna. In contrast, industry linguists describe cable televi-
sion as "wired TV." See R. SMiTH, THE WIRED NATION 1 (1970).
20. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw: 1965 REVISION BILL 40 (Comm. Print, pt. 6 1965)
[hereinafter cited as SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. See also R. SvITH, supra note
19, at 5.
21. See generally Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 701-02
(1965).
22. See generally Note, The Development of Video Technology, 25 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 789, 794 n.42 (1980).
23. Resale carrier licensees do not have to obtain permission to retransmit
the signals of commercial broadcasting stations, because § 605 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 permits "receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the
contents of any radio communication which is broadcast or transmitted by am-
ateurs or others for the use of the general public." 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). Sec-
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sends it to an "uplink," or earth transmitting station,24 that
transmits the signal to the satellite. The satellites from which
cable stations now receive much of their programming are lo-
cated 22,300 miles above the equator in geosynchronous orbit.25
On each satellite, there are from twelve to twenty-four "tran-
sponders" 26 capable of receiving signals from an uplink. The
transponders amplify the signals they receive from earth
before relaying them to a "downlink."27 From the downlink the
signals are sent to a cable system headend,2 8 and then on to in-
dividual subscribers via coaxial cable.2 9
tion 605, however, prohibits the interception of radio and television signals that
are not intended for the public. Thus, cable systems may not obtain satellite
retransmissions without the resale carriers' permission. Commercial broad-
casting stations are also prohibited from retransmitting the signals of other
broadcasting stations without first obtaining permission. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(a)
(1976).
24. These uplink earth transmitting stations employ large antennas whose
aim may be redirected at satellites which stray from their positions. See Note,
supra note 22, at 809. Uplinks generally use the 6 gigaHertz (GHz) frequency
band for transmissions. Id. at 809 n.160.
25. Perle, Is the Bird Pie in the Sky?-Communications Satellites and the
Law, 27 BuLT_ COPYRIGHT Soc'y 325, 325 (1980). A "geosynchronous" orbit is
one that permits the satellite to remain stationary relative to the earth's sur-
face. Id. A satellite in geosynchronous orbit can "see" approximately one third
of the earth's surface. Id. at 326. There are, however, only a finite number of
positions within the 22,300 mile orbit that can cast a "footprint" over all of
North America. See Note, supra note 22, at 810 & n.168. These positions, there-
fore, are highly prized. In addition, because all communications satellites use
the same frequency, they must be spaced sufficiently far apart to avoid interfer-
ing with each other. Id. at 810. Communications satellites are now spaced at
intervals of from four to five degrees of arc. Id. at 810 n.169. Thus, only a finite
number of geostationary satellites may cast their "footprints" across all of the
continental United States. Id. at 810. Because demand is high and the supply
finite, competition for access to satellite space has been likened to that of a
gold rush. See How Cable-TV Success Hinges on Satellites, Bus. Wir., Sept. 14,
1981, at 89.
26. Transponders are antennas on the satellite that receive signals from an
uplink. See Note, supra note 22, at 809. There are from 12 to 24 transponders
on. a given satellite. Perle, supra note 25, at 326.
27. A downlink is a receiving antenna situated on the earth. Note, supra
note 22, at 808.
28. Perle, supra note 25, at 326. The headend is the central facility from
which a cable system distributes all signals to its subscribers. Note, supra note
22, at 794 n.43. The signals received by the downlink are at super high fre-
quency and must be converted to very high frequency (VHF) or ultra-high fre-
quency (UHF), before transmission to subscribers. Perle, supra note 25, at 326.
29. The basic cable system consists of three parts: a set of antennas that
receives external signals, a headend that processes and amplifies the received
signals, and a distribution network that carries the signals to subscribers.
Note, supra note 22, at 794. A modern cable system's antennas will receive the
signals of all local commercial television stations, because FCC regulations re-
quire cable systems located within the 100 largest markets to carry, upon re-
quest, the broadcast signals of commercial stations within whose "specified
zone" the cable system is situated. 47 C.FR. § 76.61 (a) (1) (1982). In addition,
[Vol. 67:963
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Those lessees of transponders who originate their own pro-
gramming, such as Home Box Office (HBO), charge cable sta-
tions a copyright royalty fee for the right to receive their
signals.3 0 Three carriers, Eastern Microwave, Inc. (EMI),
United Video, Inc. (UVI), and Southern Satellite Systems, Inc.
(SSS), lease transponder space on satellites3 ' but do not origi-
nate their own programming. Instead, the FCC licenses these
the antennas may receive one or more distant signals distributed by microwave
or satellite intermediate carriers. See Ladd, Schrader, Liebowitz & Olev, Copy-
right, Cable, the Compulsory License: A Second Chance, 3 CoM. & L, Summer,
1981, at 3, 24. [hereinafter cited as Ladd].
The headend functions as the "master control station and nerve center"
that processes and amplifies each of the signals the antennas receive. Note,
supra note 22, at 794 n.43. The signals received by the headend must be "trans-
lated" from the incoming carrier frequency to a standard broadcast frequency
corresponding to a channel on a standard television set. Id.
After processing and translation, the signal is amplified and allocated to a
particular channel corresponding to the channel on the viewer's television dial.
Id. The signal may be relayed at once for immediate viewing, or it may be
taped and stored for later distribution. A modern headend has the capability of
deleting selected portions of incoming signals, and substituting material
originated in the locale, such as local advertising. This is generally not done,
however, especially in the case of incoming signals from commercial television
broadcast stations, since a cable system that willfully alters the content of the
program is liable for copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (3) (Supp. V
1981).
From the headend, the signal is carried by coaxial cable to the subscriber's
television set. A coaxial cable is a metal conductor surrounded by another
metal conductor, separated by insulation. Note, supra note 22, at 794 n.44. Un-
like signals sent over the air, signals sent by wire are less susceptible to inter-
ference from one another, id., even when a cable carries thirty or more signals.
See id. at 795 n.47.
At the subscriber's reception end is a standard television set, fitted so as to
connect with the coaxial cable. Id. at 794 n.44. The only extra equipment the
subscriber needs is either a small converter box that replaces the standard tel-
evision channel selector or a transformer that matches the cable signal to the
signal receiving capability of the television set. Id. at 795 n.45. The subscriber
may, if desired, simply disconnect the cable and use the television to receive
programs off the air. To acquire cable service, a person pays a one-time instal-
lation fee that covers the cost of stringing cable to the home, installing an out-
let, and supplying the home with one converter box. Thereafter, the subscriber
generally pays a monthly fee to receive the CATV's basic complement of pro-
gramming. Ladd, supra, at 39.
30. See Ladd, supra note 29, at 31-32.
31. See Eastern Microwave, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 2195 (1979); United Video,
Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d 1629 (1978); Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153
(1976). Altogether the F.C.C. has issued seven resale common carrier licenses.
Not all the carriers are operational, however. See supra note 5. Both EMI and
SSS lease transponders on RCA Americom's SATCOM I satellite. See 70
F.C.C.2d at 2201; 62 F.C.C.2d at 162. The SATCOM I satellite is popular with en-
tities like EMI and SSS, because it casts a footprint covering the largest part of
North America. See How Cable-TV Success Hinges on Satellites, Bus. Wm.,
Sept. 14, 1981, at 89.
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three entities as "resale common carriers." 32 The resale com-
mon carrier license permits EMI, UVI and SSS to intercept the
broadcast signals of independent television broadcasting sta-
tions, WOR-New York, WGN-Chicago, and WTBS-Atlanta, re-
spectively, and to transmit the signal to cable station headends
throughout the United States.33 Rather than charge a copyright
royalty, each resale carrier charges the cable system a flat, FCC
regulated rate based on the number of subscribers in that sys-
tem. 34 Satellite resale distribution of programming has thus
made it possible for cable stations to import signals from great
distances without the use of costly terrestrial microwave
relays.35
B. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS AFFECTING
SECONDARY TRANSMISSIONS
Before the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, cable sys-
tems enjoyed absolute freedom from copyright liability for the
retransmission of commercial television broadcasts to their
32. See supra note 1. Originally the FCC licensed only the underlying car-
riers as common carriers. In a major policy shift, the FCC announced it would
consider granting common carrier status to resale carriers, perceiving "no dif-
ference between resale and traditional communications common carriage."
Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Serv.
& Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 308 (1976). The FCC made resale common carrier
licenses contingent upon the carriers' preservation of the "sine qua non" of
common carrier status-nondiscriminatory service to the public. Id.
In 1976, the FCC granted resale carrier status to SSS, authorizing it to lease
a single transponder aboard RCA Americom's SATCOM I satellite for the pur-
pose of providing the signal of Ted Turner's independent broadcasting station,
WTBS-Atlanta, to cable stations throughout the United States. See Southern
Satellite Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 162 (1976). Ruling on SSS's request for
authorization, the FCC perceived satellite resale delivery as a unique and crea-
tive use of communications technology that "would also make available a serv-
ice that cannot be efficiently or economically provided by terrestrial means and
would result in an increase in the diversity of cable television programming
available to the public." Id. at 159-60. Because the FCC required that SSS not
'principally serve ... its own, or closely affiliated private business interests,"
id. at 160, Ted Turner, who originally owned SSS, sold the corporation to a
business acquaintance for $1. M'Media Shoots at Superstations, VARIETY, April
30, 1980, at 164.
33. See Application of Eastern Microwave, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 2195, 2197
(1979); United Video, Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d 1629, 1631 (1978); Southern Satellite Sys-
tems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 156 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 155 (1976).
35. Transmission of signals over longer distances by terrestrial microwave
is significantly more expensive than by satellite. See Competitive Carrier
Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 327 (1979). A cable system desiring microwave de-
livery may receive FCC authorization to construct its own microwave service,
see 47 C.F.R. §§ 78.1-.35 (1982) or may obtain such a service for a fee from one of




subscribers by virtue of two United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 3 6 and
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System.37 In
Fortnightly, the Court ruled that cable systems that passively
receive and retransmit broadcast signals containing copy-
righted works do not perform publicly, and therefore, do not in-
fringe upon copyrights.38 In Teleprompter, the Court removed
any lingering doubts as to the copyright liability of cable sys-
tems when it held that its Fortnightly analysis applied even
when cable systems imported signals from great distances. 39
In the absence of cable television copyright liability, the
FCC struggled with a regulatory strategy that would act as a
substitute for effective copyright legislation and minimize
cable's competitive impact on television broadcasting.40 Uncer-
36. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). In Fortnightly, the plaintiff, United Artists, owned
the copyrights to several motion pictures. Five television stations in Penn-
sylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia received licenses from United Artists to
broadcast these motion pictures. Id. at 393. The defendant, Fortnightly Corpo-
ration, owned and operated a CATV system in two neighboring communities in
West Virginia, which, because of their location, had poor television reception.
Id. at 391. Fortnightly imported signals from the five television stations, at dis-
tances ranging from 52 to 82 miles, in order to give the communities improved
television service. Id. at 392.
37. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). In Teleprompter, the cable system imported the sig-
nal from as far away as 450 miles. Id. at 400. For a more complete discussion of
the Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions, see Puffer, The Supreme Court and
Copyright Liability for Retransmissions of TV and Radio Signals: A Dubious
Performance, 26 COPYRuGnT L. Symp. (ASCAP) 127 (1981).
38. See 392 U.S. at 396-99. The Court found that the existing copyright stat-
utes offered little guidance as to the meaning of the copyright owner's right to
publicly perform a dramatic work. To assist its analysis, the Court instead em-
ployed an analogy, and considered whether the cable system functioned more
like a passive viewer/antenna than an active performer. Id. at 396-97. The
Court concluded that the cable systems fell "on the viewer's side of the line,"
because cable systems function essentially like sophisticated antennas, merely
"enhanc[ing] the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signal." Id. at
399.
39. The Court stated:
The privilege of receiving the broadcast electronic signals and of con-
verting them into the sights and sounds of the program inheres in all
members of the public who have the means of doing so. The reception
and rechanneling of these signals for simultaneous viewing is essen-
tially a viewer function, irrespective of the distance between the broad-
casting station and the ultimate viewer.
415 U.S. at 408.
40. The FCC later acknowledged that its early regulations had copyright
overtones:
During our early regulatory involvement with CATV, the phrase "un-
fair competition" came to signify a set of issues which sounded princi-
pally in copyright but to some extent in less well defined notions that it
was inequitable for CATV and commercial broadcasting to compete
freely when the former did not pay for the programming it re-transmit-
ted to its subscribers ....
1983]
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tain as to the reach of its authority under the Communications
Act of 1934,41 the FCC adopted a series of short-lived cable sig-
nal carriage rules during the 1960's.42 Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Fortnightly, the Commission proposed ex-
Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and
Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 650-51 n.49 (1979).
41. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976). The FCC receives its jurisdictional author-
ity from the Act.
42. Initially, the FCC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the cable televi-
sion industry because a cable station did not "broadcast" within the meaning of
the definition provided in § 153 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 153
(1976). See Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV
Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Devel-
opment of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 428-29 (1959). The Commis-
sion changed this position in 1962, however, when it perceived that cable
threatened the economic viability of local UHF television broadcasting. See
Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465, affd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). In Carter Mountain, the FCC inter-
vened to deny the application of a terrestrial microwave carrier that had peti-
tioned for a license to supply a cable station with a distant signal. The FCC
determined that the proposed service would threaten the economic viability of
the sole commercial broadcasting station in Riverton, Wyoming, KWRB-TV. Id.
at 461-64. The FCC believed that the cable station served by the intermediate
carrier would duplicate the programming of KWRB-TV, thereby causing audi-
ence diversion and a loss of advertising revenue. Id. at 463-64.
During the next few years the Commission experimented with several dif-
ferent regulatory schemes, all designed to deal with the increasing competition
between the cable and broadcast industries. In 1965, the FCC exerted jurisdic-
tion over "microwave-served" cable systems, mandating that such systems
carry all local television stations and prohibiting duplication of local television
programming within fifteen days of the local broadcast. See Rules re Micro-
wave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 742-43 (1965). To support its exercise of juris-
diction the FCC noted that cable systems fell "outside of the program
distribution process" because they were not subject to § 325 of the Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. § 325 (1976), which forbids rebroadcasting of an originating
station's signal without consent. 38 F.C.C. at 704. Thus, the FCC pointed out,
cable systems were able to use programming without having to bargain for it in
the marketplace. Id. at 703-05.
A year later, the Commission exerted jurisdiction over all cable systems.
See CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). The FCC's jurisdiction over cable was upheld
in United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968), as "reasonably an-
cillary to... the Commission's... regulation of television broadcasting." Id.
at 178. The rules adopted in 1966 maintained the nonduplication and
mandatory carriage of local stations requirements, although they shortened the
period of duplication protection. 2 F.C.C.2d at 746-47. In addition, cable sys-
tems operating within the top 100 television markets could import distant sig-
nals after a hearing before the Commission to establish that such service would
be in the public interest and would maintain a healthy UHF television broad-
cast service. Id. at 782. The FCC adopted this case-by-case method of distant
signal regulation because of its continuing uncertainty about the economic rela-
tionship between commercial and cable television. Id. at 788. Experience with
the evidentiary hearing method proved it unworkable. Inquiry Into the Eco-
nomic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71
F.C.C.2d 632, 650 (1979).
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perimental rules 43 that were never formally adopted.44 Under
these rules, cable systems in the largest 100 television markets
were required to obtain "retransmission consent" from distant
broadcasting stations originating signals that the systems
wished to carry.45 Because none of the originating stations
gave their consent, distant signal transmission in these markets
ceased.46
While FCC regulation effectively throttled the growth of
the cable industry, congressional efforts to revise the copyright
laws stalled. An impasse between the cable television interests
on one side and the broadcasters and copyright owners on the
other had impeded enactment of a new copyright act for
years. 47 Seeking a way out of this dilemma and eager to free
itself from restrictive regulation, the cable industry agreed to
the terms of a compromise between the competing interests,
known as the "Consensus Agreement." 48 Under the terms of
this compromise, the cable industry agreed to accept the less
restrictive FCC regulations contained within the Consensus
Agreement in exchange for being subjected to only partial
copyright liability under the proposed Copyright Act. 49 The
Consensus Agreement and congressional dissatisfaction with
the results in Fortnightly5O and Teleprompter5l provided the
necessary impetus for passage of the Act.52
The 1976 Act radically departs from prior law53 in its treat-
43. CATV, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
44. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 152-53 (1972).
45. CATV, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 432-34 (1968).
46. Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcast-
ing and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 651 (1979). Appropriately, the FCC
has characterized this era as the "freeze." Id. Under the 1968 rules, CATVs
were also prohibited from obtaining such distant signals if they bypassed or
"leap-frogged" closer stations in favor of popular distant stations. Id. The
mandatory carriage and nonduplication rules, see supra note 42, remained
unchanged.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5703 [hereinafter cited as HousE COPYRIGHT REPORT].
48. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 165-68 (1972).
49. Id.
50. See supra note 36.
51. See supra note 37.
52. See Copyright Law Revision " Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, on H.R. 2223, Part 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2063-65
(1975) (Copyright Office Briefing Papers).
53. Traditionally, the owner of a copyright was said to be the proprietor of
a "bundle of rights" consisting of the rights of reproduction, adaptation, publi-
cation, performance, and display. See HousE COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note
47, at 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5674. Section 106 of
the Copyright Act embodies these rights. Prior to the 1976 Act, ownership of
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ment of cable television's copyright liability.54 Section 106 of
the Act grants the copyright owner of a dramatic work5 5 the ex-
clusive right to "perform the ... work publicly."56 Section 101
defines "performing a work" as showing its images or making
its sounds audible "by means of any device or process." 57 Per-
forming "publicly" can be accomplished either by performing
the work "at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered" or by transmit-
ting it to such a place "by means of any device or process."58
copyright was indivisible. See, e.g., Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales
Co., 282 F. 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1922); M. NnmPER, NnMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01 [A], at
10-4 (1982). If the proprietor wished to convey rights in copyright to another, he
or she either could assign all the rights comprising the bundle or grant a li-
cense to permit something very specific. The courts construed the transfer of
less than full rights as a license. See, e.g., Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243
F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In theory, an assignee had standing to sue for an
infringement, but a licensee did not. See, e.g., Manning v. Miller Music Corp.,
174 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In practice, however, courts gradually re-
fused to follow the indivisibility rule. See, e.g., Gershwin v. United States, 153
F. Supp. 477, 489 (Ct. Cl. 1957); M. NndmER, supra, § 10.01 [B], at 10-9 to 10-10.
The 1976 Act, by expressly recognizing the concept of the divisibility of
copyright ownership, allows a copyright owner to convey as many or as few of
the rights comprising the bundle as he or she desires. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)
(Supp. V 1981). The Act also permits the transferee of any one of the divisible
rights to initiate a copyright infringement suit to enforce that particular right
without joining the original copyright owner. See id. § 501.
54. The Act explicitly makes cable systems liable for copyright infringe-
ment if they do not comply with the compulsory license provisions contained in
§ 111(d). See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981). For a complete discus-
sion of compulsory licensing, see infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
55. The Act does not define the term "dramatic work." Congress did in-
tend, however, to include television broadcasts within the scope of this term.
Television broadcasts clearly come within the definition of "audio visual
works," see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981), which Congress included within the
recognizable "subject matter" of copyright. See id. § 102.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. V 1981). Section 106 also incorporates the other
rights comprising the traditional "bundle of rights" that inhere in the copyright
owner. See supra note 53. The pertinent text of § 106 states:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the follow-
ing:
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choregraphic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly ....
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. V 1981).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981). This section defines "performing" a
work as: "[T] o recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means
of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying
it audible." Id.
58. Id. To perform a work "publicly" is defined in § 101 as:
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The House Copyright Report 9 indicates that the public per-
formance right definition is broad enough to cover "any further
act by which [the public performance] is transmitted or com-
municated to the public,"60 including retransmissions by cable
television systems.6 ' Sections 101 and 106, therefore, overrule
Fortnightly and Teleprompter and, standing alone, would sub-
ject both intermediate carriers and cable systems to full copy-
right liability for retransmissions of commercial television
broadcasts.
The broad rights conferred on copyright owners by sections
101 and 106, however, are modified by section 111, which limits
copyright liability for certain kinds of "secondary transmis-
sions." 62 Section 111(c) 63 grants cable systems a "compulsory
license" for secondary transmissions of signals broadcast by
FCC licensed television stations, provided that the cable sys-
tems do not alter the signals they transmit. 64 Instead of paying
royalties directly to the copyright owners in the traditional
way, cable systems must pay a percentage of their gross re-
ceipts 65 into a copyright pool administered by the Copyright
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle
of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered, or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or dis-
play of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by
means of any device or process, whether the members of the public ca-
pable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
Id.
59. HOUSE COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 47, at 63, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5676.
60. Id.
61. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5677. The report
also points out that a performance does not constitute an infringement unless
it is also public. Id. Thus, characterization of an action as an infringement re-
quires a two step inquiry.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (Supp. V 1981) defines a "secondary transmission"
with reference to the term "primary transmission." A primary transmission is
defined as "a transmission made to the public by the transmitting facilities
whose signals are being received and further transmitted by a secondary trans-
mission service, regardless of where or when the performance or display was
first transmitted." Id. A secondary transmission is defined as "the further
transmitting of a primary transmission simultaneously with the primary trans-
mission, or nonsimultaneously with the primary transmission if by a cable sys-
tem not located in whole or in part within the boundary of the forty-eight
contiguous States, Hawaii, or Puerto Rico." Id.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (Supp. V 1981).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (3) (Supp. V 1981) prohibits cable systems from will-
fully altering the content, advertising or station announcements embodied in
the commercial television station's transmission. Cable systems must also
comply with certain formal notice and filing requirements. See id. § 111(d).
65. Originally, the percentage varied between 0.2% and 0.675%, depending
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Royalty Tribunal (CRT).66 Periodically, the CRT distributes
the fees among the copyright owners whose works were re-
transmitted.67 Although the compulsory license fees are set by
statute, the CRT has authority to increase the statutory fee in
the event of inflation, changes in cable system subscription
rates, or modifications in FCC cable regulations. 68 In compari-
son to what broadcasting stations pay for program acquisition,
the compulsory license fee amounts to only partial copyright li-
ability. 69 The compulsory license scheme reflects Congress's
on the number of distant signals the cable system transmitted. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(d) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981). The rate has since been adjusted to account for
inflation. See infra note 68.
66. Congress created the CRT to administer the collection and distribution
of royalty fees generated by the compulsory license scheme. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 801-810 (Supp. V 1981).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (4) (Supp. V 1981). Although the Act envisioned an-
nual distribution, id. § 111(d) (5), the CRT did not make its first distribution de-
termination until two years after the Act went into effect. Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 1978 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Cable Royalty Determination], upheld in National
Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 371 (D.C. Cir.
1982). From a total pool of $15,141,141.97, the CRT distributed $14,734,078.30, the
balance of $407,063.67 covering the CRT's administrative costs. 45 Fed. Reg. at
63,042.
The CRT based its allocation scheme on two factors: (1) the harm to copy-
right owners caused by cable secondary transmissions, and (2) the value of the
programming to cable stations. Id. at 63,035. It further determined that it was
the clear intent of Congress in drafting § 111 to reward only program producers
and syndicators. Id. at 63,032-33. Accordingly, the CRT denied a claim by the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) on behalf of commercial television
stations which claimed injury on account of cable transmissions of syndicated
programming into the broadcasters' local markets from distant sources which
duplicated programming for which the local broadcasters had acquired the ex-
clusive rights. Id. The CRT allocated the funds according to the following
scheme: (1) program syndicators, 75%; (2) Joint Sports claimants and NCAA,
12%; (3) Public Broadcasting Service, 5.25%; (4) Music Performing Rights Soci-
eties, 4.5%, and (5) U.S. and Canadian Broadcasters, 3.25%. Id. at 63,042.
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(a)(2)(A)-(D) (Supp. V 1981). The CRT has ad-
justed the statutory licensing fee upwards by 21% to account for inflation since
1978. See 37 C.F.R. § 308 (1982). The rates now vary from 0.242% to 0.817% of
gross receipts. Id. § 308.2. The CRT may make such inflation adjustments only
every fifth calendar year. 17 U.S.C. § 804(a) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1981). It may, how-
ever, revise rates if requested to do so by any copyright owner within 12
months of amendments to the FCC signal carriage rules. Id. § 804(b). The lat-
ter adjustments must be "reasonable in the light of the changes affected by the
amendment to such rules and regulations." Id. § 801(b) (2) (B). Thus, the Act
does not appear to contemplate drastic adjustments designed to achieve parity
between the program acquisition costs of broadcasters and cable operators.
69. The fee paid by cable systems for compulsory licenses in no case ex-
ceeds a modest 2.390% of gross subscription receipts. See 37 C.F.R. § 308.2
(1982) (computed by totalling the maximum percentage for each distant signal
equivalent). In comparison, broadcasters on the average spent nearly 25% of
revenues for program acquisition in 1977. Cable Television Syndicated Pro-
gram Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1016-17 (1979). Even the CRT admit-
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desire to achieve a balance among the competing interests
within the broadcasting industry, as well as its belief that it
was impractical and burdensome to subject the fledgling cable
industry to full copyright liability.7 0 Congress was also eager to
encourage the proliferation of cable stations, believing that ac-
cess to a wider variety of programming would serve the public
interest.7 ' Section 111, therefore, incorporates the basic terms
of the Consensus Agreement, 72 balancing the copyright owner's
interests in copyright royalties and control over copyrighted
works against the cable industry's need to survive in the mar-
ketplace. Thus, section 111(c) relieves cable television of the
burden and expense of negotiating for permission to transmit
commercial television broadcasts, subjecting it instead to only
partial copyright liability in the form of a compulsory license.7 3
In exchange, section 111(d) is designed to prevent unfair com-
petition with broadcasting stations by requiring cable systems
that wish to be eligible for compulsory licenses to comply with
FCC regulations.
Section 111 further modifies the broad rights conferred by
sections 101 and 106 by limiting the copyright liability of secon-
dary transmissions made by passive carriers. Section 111 (a) (3)
provides an outright exemption for secondary transmissions by
carriers who have "no direct or indirect control over the con-
tent or selection" of the copyrighted works or over their recipi-
ents, and whose activities "consist solely of providing wires,
cables, or other communications channels for the use of
ted that "the cable system operators obtain the benefits of programming at a
rate which does not reflect the true market value of the original copyright own-
ers [sic] product to the cable system operators." Cable Royalty Determination,
45 Fed. Reg. at 63,036.
70. See HousE COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 47, at 89, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5704 Mitchell, Cable Television Under the 1972
FCC Rules and the Impact of Alternative Copyright Fee Proposals-An Eco-
nomic Analysis, reprinted in Copyright Law Revision: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2223, Part 1, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 517, 559-60 (1975). The Mitchell study asserted that cable was a
capital intensive industry, with high operating costs and a low return on invest-
ment. Id. at 538-40. At that time, even program suppliers agreed with the as-
sertion by cable operators that it would have been impractical to require
individual cable systems to bargain with copyright owners for permission to re-
transmit. Id. at 758 (Testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture As-
sociation of America).
71. 122 CONG. REC. 32,009 (1976) (statement of Rep. Danielson).
72. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.




In the years between 1972, when the Consensus Agreement
was adopted, and 1978, when the Copyright Act went into effect,
the FCC cable regulations contained within the Consensus
Agreement remained the only means of regulating the cable in-
dustry. Two of these rules, the distant signal carriage7 5 and
syndicated exclusivity rules,7 6 served as the primary substi-
tutes for copyright protection. Under the most recent version
of the distant signal rules, a cable station could import only the
number of distant signals necessary to fulfill a given comple-
ment of signals, depending on the size of the station and the
market.7 7 For example, a cable system with more than 1000
subscribers located in one of the top fifty markets could import
the number of distant signals necessary to provide its viewers
with a full complement of three network stations and three in-
dependent stations.7 8 The most recent syndicated exclusivity
rules 79 required a cable system located in the top fifty markets
to delete syndicated programming8 0 from distant signals for a
period of one year from the date the program was first licensed
to a television station anywhere in the United States.8 1 A cable
system situated in the second fifty markets had to delete syndi-
cated programming only if one of the stations in its market
owned the exclusive rights to the program.8 2 Serving as substi-
tutes for the copyright owners' control over the distribution of
their works, these two rules helped minimize the impact of
cable on the broadcasting industry. The distant signal rules
74. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (3) (Supp. V 1981). Section Ill(a) (3) states in perti-
nent part:
(a) The secondary transmission of a primary transmission em-
bodying a performance or a display of a work is not an infringement of
copyright if-
(3) The secondary transmission is made by any carrier who has
no direct or indirect control over the content or selection of the pri-
mary transmission or over the particular recipients of the secondary
transmission, and whose activities with respect to the secondary trans-
mission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other communica-
tions channels for the use of others ....
75. 47 C.F.R. §§76.57(b)-(d), 76.59(b)-(d), 76.61(b)-(d), 76.63 (1979)
(amended 1980).
76. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-.161 (1979) (repealed 1980).
77. 47 C.F.R. §§76.57(b)-(d), 76.59(b)-(d), 76.61(b)-(d), 76.63 (1979)
(amended 1980).
78. 47 C.F.R. § 76.61(b) (1979) (repealed 1980).
79. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-.161 (1979) (repealed 1980).
80. Syndicated programming is programming sold by program suppliers
for nonnetwork distribution. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(p) (1980) (deleted 1981).
81. 47 C.F.R. § 76.151(a) (1979) (repealed 1980).
82. Id. § 76.151(b).
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limited the number of distant stations with which a local broad-
caster would have to compete, and the syndicated exclusivity
rules ensured that broadcasters and program suppliers re-
ceived the exclusivity protection for which they had bargained.
After passage of the 1976 Copyright Act extended copyright
liability to cable television, the FCC reevaluated the need for
its signal carriage rules. 83 Analyzing the effects of deregula-
tion,84 the FCC concluded that deletion of the distant signal
and syndicated exclusivity rules would not affect broadcaster
revenue enough to reduce program supply.85 In 1980, the Com-
mission repealed the two rules. 86 As a result, cable systems
may now import any number of distant signals without regard
to the exclusivity protection that the local broadcasters may
have purchased in their contracts with program suppliers.
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The 1976 Copyright Act's compulsory license scheme, rein-
forced by FCC deregulation of the cable industry, has achieved
one of the results Congress intended. Cable television is no
longer merely a supplementary service primarily aiding broad-
cast reception in rural areas, but is a viable communications
medium. In recent years, cable television has dramatically in-
creased revenues 87 and its share of the television viewing mar-
ket.88 In addition, many consumers are in a position to have
83. See Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 65 F.C.C.2d 9 (1977); Cable Television Syn-
dicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 61 F.C.C.2d 746 (1976).
84. See Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979). In its report, the
FCC concluded that the cable industry's share of the viewing market (its "pen-
etration") would never exceed 40% in the major urban markets or 48% nation-
wide. Id. at 669-72. The FCC analysis failed, however, to consider how
improved technology might help cable achieve greater penetration.
85. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d
1004, 1026 (1979).
86. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79
F.C.C.2d 663 (1980). The Commission's decision was upheld in Malrite T.V. v.
F.C.C., 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981).
87. Cable advertising revenues jumped from $58.4 million in 1980 to a prob-
able $251.8 million in 1982, while revenues from subscription fees rose from $2.5
billion in 1980 to a probable $4.4 billion in 1982. Itolsendolph, Tougher Times for
Cable TV, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1982, § 3 (Business), at 24. Although Mr. Hol-
sendolph was optimistic about the future growth of cable, he believed that in-
creased competition from other developing communications technologies might
slow the rate of growth somewhat. Id.
88. Between the years 1970 and 1977, cable television increased its share of
the television market at the rate of approximately 1% per year. In 1977, the
rate doubled. Berkman, The Video Revolution: Some Counter-Revolutionary
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cable installed at low cost because of a high "passby rate."89
Some industry analysts predict that fifty percent of all televi-
sion homes will have cable service within ten years.90
While the compulsory license scheme and FCC deregula-
tion may account for some of the cable industry expansion,
much of the growth is attributable to technological innovation.
The average cable network provides only ten channels, but the
most modern can now provide fifty or more.9 1 In addition, sat-
ellite distribution permits cable systems to offer diverse en-
tertainment, sports, and movie programming to their
subscribers.92 Increased channel capacity and program diver-
sity have enabled cable systems to attract paying subscribers
and to compete in the larger urban markets 93 where television
broadcasting stations already supply the public with several
free channels.9 4
The increased concentration of the ownership of cable sys-
Ideas, TELEVISION Q., Spring 1981, at 77, 78-80. Penetration increased by a phe-
nomenal 7% in 1979-80 alone. MAJoxrrY STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 291. In
1979, the FCC predicted that cable penetration would not exceed 48% in the
near future, Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 672 (1979), and would never
exceed 40% in the major urban markets. Id. at 669. Later projections show that
the FCC prediction may have been overly pessimistic. Projections in the MA-
joRrry STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, predict total cable penetration of 60% by
1990. Id. at 291.
89. "Passby rate" is a trade term defined as the percentage of TV homes in
a market area that are passed by a cable system's coaxial lines, just as a phone
company's wires pass by nearly every home. MAjoRiTY STAFF REPORT, supra
note 17, at 350.
Approximately 42% of all television households are passed by a cable sys-
tem's wires. Id. FCC data indicate that about 55% of the homes passed by cur-
rently opt for cable television reception. Id.
90. Id. at 349. Cable television delivered programming to 22-27% of Ameri-
can television households as of 1981, id. at 348-49, and to 14% of the households
in the nation's ten largest television markets. Id. at 349.
91. MAJoRrrY STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 296.
92. There are approximately 35 pay-cable programming services distrib-
uted by satellite, with another 20 expected within the next two years. Cable
Programming Catches Up With Demand, Bus. Wy., Feb. 22, 1982, at 130. Cable
systems may select from such program possibilities as Home Box Office
(HBO), offering primarily sports, entertainment, and movies; Spotlight, The
Movie Channel, and Showtime, three competitors to HBO; Entertainment and
Sports Programming Network (ESPN); and The Disney Channel, offering fam-
ily programming. Id. Many cable operators offer a core package of two or three
pay-cable services at a combined price. Subscribers then choose from the
other services a la carte. Id.
93. See supra notes 88, 90.
94. Besides having to compete with several free broadcast channels, an ur-
ban cable operator must also contend with the higher capital costs of construct-
ing its cable network. It is far more expensive to obtain the necessary rights of
way in urban areas than in rural areas. See R. Smrr, supra note 19, at 24.
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tems in the hands of a few large conglomerates has also
strengthened the bargaining power of cable television interests.
These conglomerates, known as Multiple Systems Operators
(MSOs), are controlled by such corporations as Westinghouse,
Warner, Cox, and Storer.95 The twenty largest MSOs currently
serve sixty-five percent of cable viewing households.96 Many of
the MSOs are also leading suppliers of cable programming.9 7
This contrasts with the situation within the commercial broad-
casting industry, in which the FCC prohibits any one entity
from owning more than seven broadcast stations.98 Thus, the
potential exists for MSOs to develop market strength in the
cable industry equalling or exceeding that which the networks
presently possess in the commercial broadcasting industry.
Because compulsory licensing, technological advancement,
and increased economic power have enabled cable to compete
successfully, many commentators have argued that the deregu-
lation of cable television provides the industry with an unnec-
essary windfall.99 Congress, in enacting section 111 of the
Copyright Act, sought to implement the Consensus Agreement
compromise and to insure a fair balance between the cable and
95. Mjorry STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 293.
96. Id. at 294. The following chart gives a breakdown of the size of the ten





Westinghouse (includes Teleprompter) 1,728
Cox Communications 1,164
Storer Broadcasting 1,115
Warner Amex Cable 943
Times-Mirror 699
Newhouse Broadcasting 623
Rogers UA Cablesystem 611
Viacom Communications 561
Holsendolph, supra note 87, at 24.
97. MA.OTR= STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 295.
98. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a) (2) (1982). Of these seven stations, no more than
five may be VHF. Id. Each of the networks owns five VHF outlets. MAJom'ry
STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 284. Under the "cross-ownership" rules, a
cable system is prohibited from carrying any television broadcast signal if the
cable system has an ownership interest in either a national television network,
a local television station, or a local television translator station whose service
areas overlap with the cable system. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1982).
99. See generally Besen, Manning & Mitchell, Copyright Liability for Cable
Television: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 67
(1978); Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the Market-
place Mode 2 Comm/ENT 477 (1980); Note, Cable Television's Compulsory Li-
cense: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed' 25 N.Y.L. Scn. L REV. 925 (1979);
Note, supra note 8; Note, supra note 14.
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broadcasting interests.100 Elimination of the distant signal and
syndicated exclusivity rules dismantled a major component of
this compromise. The balance now tilts decisively in favor of
the cable industry. Deregulation, in combination with compul-
sory licensing, gives cable systems full access to programming
while subjecting them to only partial liability.
This combination of factors may, in the long run, adversely
affect the supply and diversity of programming available to the
public-a result contrary to Congress's original intentions. Per-
mitting cable systems to acquire an ever-increasing volume of
distant signal programming at the artificially low prices set by
the statutory license fee perpetuates and exaggerates the pro-
gram acquisition imbalance that now exists between the cable
and broadcast industries,' 0 ' and thus undercompensates pro-
gram syndicators and producers. Some economic theorists
have predicted that increased market penetration by cable will
produce a "free-rider" problem, preventing program producers
from obtaining the market value of their programming because
a large portion of the available outlets receive the programming
at low cost.102 If this free-rider problem becomes sufficiently
severe, program producers will either produce less expensive
programming or withhold their programs from the market,
rather than risk taking a loss.103
Critics of the compulsory license scheme have already sug-
gested proposals for reform. Some have advocated dispensing
with it altogether.104 Others have urged the CRT to raise the
statutory licensing fees. 0 5 The most comprehensive proposal
involves requiring cable systems to obtain "retransmission con-
sent" from broadcasters whose signals they wish to dis-
100. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
102. See Besen, Manning & Mitchell, supra note 99, at 85-90.
103. The FCC predicted that cable penetration and distant signal penetra-
tion would never achieve levels significant enough to threaten broadcaster or
copyright owner revenues. See Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Be-
tween Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 669 (1979).
The FCC analysis thus runs counter to the assumptions underlying the Coase
theorem. See Besen, Manning & Mitchell, supra note 99, at 79. The FCC's
figures, however, are suspect. The Commission's prediction as to ultimate
cable penetration and the effects of distant signal importation on copyright
owner revenues did not take into account the increased attractiveness of cable
to viewers resulting from cable's use of satellite distributed programming.
104. See Winner, Cutting the Gordion Knot: Compulsory Licensing Under
the Cable Portion of the Copyright Act Antitrust, and Unpredictability, 3 CoM.
& L. 41, 58 (1981).
105. See Greene, supra note 11, at 303.
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tribute. 06 No one, however, has yet considered the appropriate
role of intermediate telecommunications carriers in any pro-
posed reformation of the current statutory scheme.
IL CURRENT STATUS OF INTERMEDIATE CARRIERS
UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
A. THE PASSIVE CARRIER EXEMIrON
An intermediate common carrier is exempt from copyright
liability if its secondary transmission 07 services fall within the
passive carrier exemption. 0 8 A carrier fits within this exemp-
tion if it meets the following requirements: (1) it does not con-
trol the content or selection of the primary transmission; (2) it
exercises no control over the particular recipients of its (secon-
dary) transmission; and (3) its secondary transmission activi-
ties consist solely of providing wires, cable, or other
communications channels for the use of others.10 9 It is clear
that an intermediate carrier meets the second requirement.
The immediate "particular recipients" of the intermediate car-
rier's secondary transmissions are the cable systems," 0 which
are entitled to receive the carrier's secondary transmission
upon reasonable request by virtue of the carrier's status as a
"resale common carrier.""' So long as an intermediate carrier
does not refuse a reasonable request for its services, it does not
exercise control over the particular recipients of its secondary
transmissions.
Whether an intermediate carrier is providing the wires,
uplinks, and cables of its relay system solely for the use of
"others" is a more problematic question, and is tied to whether
an intermediate carrier exercises control over the content or
106. See Brotman, supra note 99, at 486; Note, supra note 8, at 638.
107. See supra note 62.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (3) (Supp. V 1981). There are four kinds of secondary
transmissions which enjoy an outright exemption from copyright infringement.
See id. § 111(a) (1)-(4). Only the exemption for passive carriers, id. § 111(a) (3),
is relevant to this discussion.
109. Id. § 111(a) (3).
110. As noted by the Second Circuit in Eastern Microwave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.T.W. 3612
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1983), if the phrase "particular recipients" of the secondary trans-
mission is construed as meaning "ultimate" recipients, i.e., cable system view-
ers, then a resale carrier's activities "are even more divorced from control of
those recipients." Id. at 131 n.13.
111. A carrier approved by the FCC as a telecommunications common car-
rier is required to furnish its retransmission services upon reasonable request.




selection of the primary transmission. Arguably, if the interme-
diate carrier "selects" the television station signal it distrib-
utes, or controls the content of the copyrighted programming, it
is doing more than merely providing wires and cable for the
use of others. If the intermediate carrier does not control the
content or selection of the signal, however, then it is not dis-
tributing a preselected product, but is merely facilitating the
distribution of another's product through the intermediate car-
rier's retransmission service. An intermediate carrier, there-
fore, will generally fall outside the passive carrier exemption
only if its activities amount to control over the content or selec-
tion of the television signal.
B. JuDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE PASSIVE CARRIER EXEMPTION
With numerous factors now favoring cable television inter-
ests, local broadcasters and copyright owners have resorted to
the federal courts for protection of their interests, seeking to
prevent application of the passive carrier exemption112 to cer-
tain resale intermediate carriers. In the only two cases to reach
a substantive decision concerning the scope of the passive car-
rier exemption, WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United
Video, Inc. 113 and Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports,
Inc., 114 the Seventh and Second Circuits, respectively, appear
to have interpreted the passive carrier exemption similarly." 5
112. See supra text accompanying note 109.
113. 523 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 622, reh'g denied, 693
F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1982).
114. 534 F. Supp. 533 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3612 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
115. A third case, Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems,
Inc., No. 3-81-330 (D. Minn. April 22, 1982) (order denying defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings), also placed § 111(a) (3) in issue. Since the dis-
pute has only reached the pretrial motion stage, with Hubbard surviving a mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings, it remains to be seen whether the Eighth
Circuit will resolve these issues.
The plaintiff, Hubbard, is an independent commercial television station
based in Minneapolis where it broadcasts KSTP-TV. See Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for
Summary Judgment at 2, Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Sys-
tems, Inc., No. 3-81-330 (D. Minn. April 22, 1982). It also has stations in Tampa,
Florida, and Albuquerque, New Mexico. Id. By contract with various copyright
owners, Hubbard purchased the exclusive rights to broadcast several television
shows and movies in a certain time period within its market areas. Id at 3.
Southern has a satellite resale common carrier license, see Southern Satellite
Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153 (1976), allowing it to pick up WTBS-Atlanta, and
retransmit it, via satellite, to cable stations located throughout the country, in-
cluding stations within Hubbard's broadcast areas. Some of the programs aired
by WTBS coincided with those for which Hubbard owned the exclusive license.
Hubbard claimed the retransmissions infringed upon its copyright interest.
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In WGN, a Chicago based independent broadcasting sta-
tion, WGN-TV, brought an action against a satellite resale car-
rier, United Video (UVI),116 to enjoin the carrier's secondary
transmissions of a WGN nine p.m. news program to 1400 CATV
stations around the country. WGN claimed that UVI's deletion
of the teletext signal contained within the vertical blanking in-
terval (VBI)117 of WGN's signal and substitution of its own
Dow Jones News Service in this interval constituted copyright
infringement.1'8 UVI paid nothing for the use of WGN's signal,
nor did it seek approval from WGN for its activities." 9 On
summary judgment motions, the district court ruled that UVI
had not infringed upon WGN's copyright. The court held that
UVI qualified for the section 111(a) (3) passive carrier exemp-
tion,120 and that it had not publicly performed WGN's copy-
righted programming when it transmitted the WGN signal to
See Second Amended Complaint at 14-21, Hubbard Broadcasting Inc. v. South-
em Satellite Systems, Inc., No. M-81-330 (D. Minn. April 22, 1982).
116. The FCC has licensed United Video as a resale carrier of cable televi-
sion programming. See United Video, Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d 1629 (1978).
117. A picture is reproduced on a television set by an electron gun in the
television receiver. This gun scans left to right across lines and down the tele-
vision screen. The VBI is that period of time when the gun shuts off and trav-
els from the lower right hand corner of the screen to the upper left hand
corner. The VBI time period is equivalent to 21 scan lines of a televised pic-
ture. Nine lines of the VBI are used to transmit information that is essential to
organize the broadcast signal into a coherent picture. WGN used two of the re-
maining lines to transmit teletext information to a cable station it owns in Al-
buquerque, New Mexico. See 523 F. Supp. at 405-07.
118. Id. at 408.
119. Although no decision has so held, it appears that 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)
relieves UVI of the obligation to obtain such permission. See supra note 23. In
fact, evidence produced at trial showed that UVI did its best to keep its opera-
tions hidden from WGN. UVI gave WGN no notice of its petition before the
FCC seeking authorization to offer the Dow Jones News Service piggy-backed
on WGN's signal. 523 F. Supp. at 407. Further, documents produced showed
that UVI was rushing to establish "squatters rights" on the VBI. Id.
120. 523 F. Supp. at 410-11. The Court reasoned that the term "primary
transmission" as defined by § 111 must have copyright significance and, there-
fore, must refer to the copyrighted work rather than the signal itself. Id. at 411.
The Court concluded that, because 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines "audio-visual
works" as "works that consist of a series of related images," the nine p.m. news
program and the teletext information were not a single audiovisual work prop-
erly the subject of a single copyright. 523 F. Supp. at 412. UVI's deletion of the
teletext information thus was not the deletion of a part of a copyrighted pro-
gram. Id. Citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Fortnightly, see supra note
36, and Teleprompter, see supra note 37, the district court held that UVI was en-
titled to the § 111(a) (3) passive carrier exemption with respect to its secondary
transmission of the nine p.m. news program because merely receiving and re-
transmitting the program to its customers without editing was a "passive" func-
tion. 523 F. Supp. at 411-12. Although the district court realized that Congress
had rejected the results in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, it believed that Con-
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the cable stations.121 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed.122
Despite reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the lower court's determination that "purely pas-
sive" satellite carriers that retransmit broadcast signals with-
out alterations are entitled to claim exemptions under section
111(a) (3).123 UVI's fault lay in deleting a copyrighted portion
of that signal, the vertical blanking interval.124 Had the district
court concluded that the VBI was a copyrighted work, it too
would have ruled that UVI was not entitled to the passive car-
rier exemption.125 In addition, the court rejected UVI's argu-
ment that it had not publicly performed when it transmitted
gress was employing a similar "control and selection test" when it drafted the
§ 111(a) (3) exemption. Id. at 411-12 n.9.
The district court's analysis errs in several respects. It is unlikely that
when Congress drafted the passive carrier exemption it was adopting a test
similar to that used by the Supreme Court in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.
The wording of the carrier exemption was already in place for the 1966 Revision
Bill, see infra note 166, a full year before the Supreme Court decided Fort-
nightly. Also, the Supreme Court did not develop a "control and selection test"
per se. Instead, it merely attempted to distinguish between viewer and per-
former functions in order to determine which type of function a CATV more
nearly approximated. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 397. Selection of and control
over a broadcaster's signal were merely factors which the Supreme Court con-
sidered in categorizing this function. See id. at 400. Further, the Supreme
Court employed the viewer/performer analysis in order to determine whether
CATV activities constituted a "public performance" within the meaning of the
Copyright Act of 1909, not to determine whether a carrier should be exempt
See id. at 395.
121. 523 F. Supp. at 415. In the court's view, the transmissions were not "to
the public," as required by § 101, because the cable stations' subscribers, rather
than the stations, comprise the public. Id. The district court's distinction lacks
support, however, since Congress gave no reason to believe that it intended
"public" to be defined so narrowly. On the contrary, the HousE COPYRIGHT RE-
PORT, supra note 47, indicates that the definition of "transmission" "is broad
enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless
communications media," and that a public performance occurs each and every
time a "transmission reaches the public in any form." Id. at 64, reprinted in
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5678.
122. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622
(7th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 624. Judge Posner intimated that the parties did not contest the
scope of the common carrier exemption on appeal, stating: "What we have ex-
plained so far is common ground between the parties .... " Id In their briefs,
however, the parties did not clearly address whether UVI would have been lia-
ble had it not altered the WGN signal. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants; Brief
for Defendant-Appellee; Reply Brief, WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v.
United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982). Because that question was not
in issue, the court's discussion of the point is dicta.
124. 693 F.2d at 626. The district court held that the VBI and the nine p.m.
news program could not be the subject of a single copyright. See supra note
120.
125. See 534 F. Supp. at 412.
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the WGN signal to 1400 cable systems because cable systems
are not "the public."12 6 The court found that such a narrow
construction of the public performance criterion would render
the common carrier exemption superfluous. 127
In Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 128 a
satellite resale carrier, Eastern Microwave (EMI),129 brought a
declaratory judgment action against Doubleday, the owner of
the New York Mets professional baseball club, seeking a ruling
that EMI's retransmission of Mets games without Doubleday's
consent did not infringe upon Doubleday's copyright of Mets
broadcasts. EMI supplied its customers with a choice of six-
teen different television signals. One of those signals, WOR-
TV, carried Mets games which EMI retransmitted without al-
teration to 600 cable stations throughout the country and two
hotels in Las Vegas.*30 Prior to selecting WOR-TV for satellite
retransmission, EMI had conducted a marketing survey among
cable television systems to determine which broadcasting sta-
tion the cable systems would most like to receive.131 The dis-
trict court held that EMIs transmission to cable systems
constituted a public performance, 3 2 and that EMI was not enti-
tled to the passive carrier exemption.133 On appeal, the Second
126. 693 F.2d at 624.
127. Id. The court stated: "The passive carrier exemption would be super-
fluous if intermediate carriers such as United Video could never be infringers
anyway because they do not transmit directly to the public." Id.
128. 534 F. Supp. 533 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 51 U.SJ.W. 3612 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
129. EMI received its resale carrier license from the FCC in 1979. See East-
ern Microwave, Inc., 70 F.C.C.2d 2195 (1979).
130. 534 F. Supp. at 535.
131. Id. at 537.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 538. In ruling on the public performance question, the court con-
sidered and rejected the analysis used by the district court in WGN. Agreeing
instead with the Seventh Circuit, the EMI court found no evidence that Con-
gress "intended the word 'public' to be construed so narrowly." Id. at 536.
Therefore, the court held that EMrs retransmissions of WOR Mets broadcasts
constituted a public performance within the meaning of § 101. Id.
Turning to the carrier exemption issue, the court ruled in favor of
Doubleday on the basis of three factors. First, the court pointed out that EMI
selected the WOR signal for retransmissions to the public. Id. at 537-38. EMI
had argued that it had selected WOR because of EMrs inability to retransmit
every other broadcast signal in the country. Id. at 537. The district court found
this argument unpersuasive since EMI had specially conducted a viewer sur-
vey to determine the marketability of WOR before it made its selection. Id.
Second, the court noted that EMI exerted control over the recipients of the sec-
ondary transmission, because "it is EMI which chooses the customers with
which it will deal." Id. at 538. Third, EMI's activities, in the court's view, did
not consist solely of providing wires, cables, and communications channels for
the use of others. Id- at 538. The court reasoned that EMrs activities were as
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Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 3 4 While expressly declin-
ig to rule whether EMI had publicly performed,135 the Second
Circuit nevertheless held that EMI was entitled to the passive
carrier exemption.136
Construing the language of section 111(a) (3), the Second
Circuit held that EMI was entitled to the passive carrier ex-
emption because it had not exercised sufficient control over or
selection of either the content of the programming or the recip-
much geared toward marketing a product, WOR-TV, as providing communica-
tions facilities. Id.
134. 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982).
135. Id. at 132 n.16.
136. Id. at 133-34.
Determining whether a satellite resale carrier is liable for copyright in-
fringement more properly involves two distinct inquiries. The court should first
have considered whether the carrier had "publicly performed" within the
meaning of § 106, and second, whether the carrier qualified for the passive car-
rier exemption. Only if the court had resolved the first question affirmatively
should it have considered the second. Of course, once the court determined
that EMI was entitled to the passive carrier exemption, the question of whether
it had publicly performed became moot. Although the court's approach did not
affect the outcome in this case, it sets a poor precedent for future interpreta-
tions of the public performance right.
The court missed an opportunity to define the scope of the copyright own-
er's exclusive right to publicly perform a copyrighted work in the manner in
which Congress intended. Congress began the process of revising the copy-
right laws partly because it perceived that technological advancements had out-
stripped the language of the 1909 Copyright Act. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,
supra note 20, at xv. In so doing, it desired to draft legislation that would with-
stand future technological change. Thus, the HOUSE COPYRiGHT REPORT, supra
note 47, states: "[T] he concepts of public performance and public display cover
not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that
rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the public." Id. at 63,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5676. Later in the report Con-
gress reemphasized this point:
The definition of "transmit"---to communicate a performance or display
"by any device or process whereby images or sound are received be-
yond the place from which they are sent"--is broad enough to include
all conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless communi-
cations media, including but by no means limited to radio and televi-
sion broadcasting as we know them. Each and every method by which
the images or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked
up and conveyed is a "transmission," and if the transmission reaches
the public in [any] form, the case comes within the scope of clauses
(4) or (5) of section 106.
Id. at 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5678.
The quoted passages leave little doubt that retransmissions by supersta-
tion resale carriers constitute a public performance within the meaning of § 106.
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit's indecisiveness may allow future courts,
when faced with the task of deciding whether some presently unknown form of
communications media has publicly performed, to repeat the mistake made by
the Supreme Court in the Fortnightly and Teleprompter cases. See generally
Puffer, supra note 37.
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ients of EMIs secondary transmissions,137 and had merely pro-
vided communications facilites for the use of others.138 The
court pointed out that EMI retransmitted, without alteration,
all that it received from WOR-TV,139 and that EMI had refused
"no reasonable request for its services" by a cable system.14 0
On the question of whether EMI had "selected" the WOR sig-
nal, the Second Circuit, unlike the district court,141 found no
significance in EM's marketing survey to determine which tel-
evision station its potential customers most desired.142 In the
court's view, because EMI had leased only one transponder
aboard RCA Americom's SATCOM I satellite, technical neces-
sity compelled its one time determination to retransmit the sta-
tion most preferred by its customers. 4 3 Conceding that EMI's
activities differed from those typical of a conventional common
carrier because it served the receivers rather than the senders
of communications signals,144 the court nevertheless held that,
so long as neither EMI nor its customers altered the original
signal, the distinction was "insufficient to deny EMI the statu-
tory carrier exemption on the ground that it is controlling the
content or selection of that set of signals."145 Finally, the court
held that EMI could comply with the requirement that its activ-
ities "consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other commu-
nications channels for the use of others" 4 6 so long as it
"transmitt [ed] nothing of its own creation."147
The court rejected Doubleday's argument that EMI's adver-
tising and marketing efforts were self-serving activities directed
toward marketing a product, rather than providing a service for
the use of others.14 8 In the court's view, EMI could comply with
section 111(a) (3) if it did "no more than provide wires, etc.,
'with respect to the secondary transmission.'"1 49 In other
words, the court saw no inconsistency between EMI's obliga-
137. 691 F.2d at 130-31.
138. Id. at 131.
139. Id. at 130.
140. Id. at 131. The court attached importance to this fact because of the re-
quirement that common carriers serve the public indiscriminately. See supra
note 1.
141. See supra note 133.
142. 691 F.2d at 131 n.15.
143. Id. at 130.
144. Id. at 128.
145. Id. at 131.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
147. 691 F.2d at 131.
148. Id. at 131-32.
149. Id. at 131 n.15 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (3)).
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tion as a common carrier to provide a service for the use of
others and its aggressive marketing effort so long as it did not
alter the WOR signal.
C. EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS RELATING TO THE EXEMPTION
Both the Seventh and Second Circuits narrowly construed
the passive carrier exemption to determine what constitutes
"control over the content or selection" of copyrighted program-
ming. Even under this narrow approach, the facts in WGN
presented the Seventh Circuit with a rather straightforward
case of statutory interpretation. By deleting a portion of the
WGN signal and superimposing the Dow Jones News Service
on the VBI, UVI had clearly exercised "control over the con-
tent" of the primary transmission within the meaning of sec-
tion 111(a) (3).150 UVI could not claim to be a mere passive
intermediary, because its cable customers received a different
program from the one WGN had originally broadcast. For this
reason, the court's decision, though perhaps cursory,151 is
unassailable.
The facts in Eastern Microwave, however, present a more
difficult test of the "content and selection" language. EMI's in-
terception and retransmission of WOR broadcasts seems less
culpable than UVI's alteration of the copyrighted program.
EMI's customers at least received programs identical to those
which WOR had broadcast. Still, while EMI did not control the
content of its retransmission, it did in some sense "select"
which signal it was going to transmit. Neither WOR-TV nor the
cable stations EMI supplied initially requested that the WOR
signal be retransmitted. EMI distributed a preselected product.
The key to the problem, of course, is determining what
Congress meant by "selection" when it enacted the passive car-
rier exemption. Because the exemption's language is ambigu-
ous, the Second Circuit attempted to read the wording in a
manner consistent with "the 'common sense' of the statute."152
150. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (3) (Supp. V 1981).
151. Because the facts presented such an easy case for decision, the Sev-
enth Circuit disposed of the passive carrier issue with very little discussion. In
its only attempt to clarify the scope of the exemption, the court employed an
analogy to define a "purely passive" carrier, suggesting it is "like a telephone
company." WGN, 693 F.2d at 624. While the analogy is obviously a casual refer-
ence to the legislative history of § 111(a) (3), see infra notes 156-66 and accom-
panying text, the court failed to describe the differences between the activities
of UVI and those of AT&T, thus forgoing an opportunity to give the analogy
meaning.
152. Eastern Microwave, 691 F.2d at 127 (quoting New York State Commis-
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It concluded that when an intermediate carrier is able to re-
transmit only one primary transmission, no true "selection"
takes place when it chooses the signal it will provide.153 To hold
otherwise, the court reasoned, "would be to require that ex-
emption be denied to any carrier that did not retransmit every
television broadcast of every television station in the coun-
try."'5 4 This conclusion, however, makes sense only if one as-
sumes that the intermediate carrier must be the entity making
the retransmission decision. Cable stations, however, can, and
do, just as easily decide which stations the intermediate carrier
should transmit,155 in which case the intermediate carrier exer-
cises no control over the selection process.
The conclusion that intermediate carriers like EMI, which
actually select the signal they will transmit, do not fall within
the exemption is arguably supported by the legislative history
and is consistent with the statutory scheme. The idea of the
passive carrier exemption originated in a forerunner of the 1976
Copyright Act. The 1964 Copyright Revision Bil156 defined
"performing publicly" as "to broadcast a performance ... to
the public, or to transmit to the public a broadcast of any per-
formance... otherwise than as a common carrier."5 7 By this
language, the drafters of that bill intended to exempt existing
passive common carriers like AT&T and terrestrial microwave
relays.158 The subsequent 1965 Revision Bill,159 however, con-
tained no reference to this phrase because of concern that the
courts might unjustifiably extend the concept of a common car-
sion on Cable Television v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
820 (1978)).
153. 691 F.2d at 130.
154. Id.
155. For example, FCC regulations clearly contemplate that terrestrial mi-
crowave carriers seeking to render transmission service must establish that
such service will serve "the public interest, convenience or necessity." 47
C.F.R. § 21.700 (1981). Unless cable systems actually request such service, the
requisite public necessity would be lacking. Therefore, microwave carrier peti-
tions for authorization are responsive to the needs and requests of their cable
customers. See, e.g., Eastern Microwave Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 766, 766 n.2 (1975).
156. S. 3008, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964); H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Revision Bill].
157. Id. § 5(b) (3) (B) (emphasis added).
158. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 11947 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1964) (testimony of Rep. Jack-
son; Abe Goldman, Deputy Register of Copyrights; Abraham Kaminstein, Reg-
ister of Copyrights).
159. S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Revision Bill].
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rier to include some commercial transmitters to the public.160
Despite the deletion of the common carrier language from
the 1965 Revision Bill, the Register of Copyrights stated his be-
lief that "purely intermediate transmissions should be exempt,
but that an express exemption is not necessary to exclude
them."16 1 AT&T, however, feared that at least two of the serv-
ices it offered might not be considered "purely intermediate."
Specifically, AT&T noted that when it leased wires and other
communications facilities for the use of others its action did not
constitute a transmission interposed between two other trans-
missions, and was thus not "intermediate." 62 Similarly, AT&T
pointed out that there was little to distinguish the activities of a
cable system from those of AT&T, which typically owned and
controlled the entire cable network linking the headend with
the television sets of viewers, since both were, in some sense,
transmitting "to the public."163 In order to distinguish purely
intermediate, passive carriers like AT&T from more active per-
formers like cable systems, AT&T urged adoption of a provision
to exempt common carriers "having no control over the selec-
tion of the works to be transmitted or communicated."' 6 4 As a
result,165 subsequent revision bills included provisions exempt-
160. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 20, at 25. This fear may not
have been warranted. The definition of to "perform publicly" in the 1964 Revi-
sion Bill was far broader than the 1909 Act definition interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Fortnightly. The Court acknowledged that the existing stat-
ute provided little guidance in interpreting a technology which the drafters ob-
viously had not envisioned. 392 U.S. at 395-96. The extensive legislative
materials accompanying the 1964 and 1965 Revision Bills, however, should have
left no doubt as to Congress's intent concerning the copyright liability of cable
systems.
161. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
162. Letter from Walter Derenberg, Counsel for AT&T, to Herbert Fuchs,
Counsel for Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm. 3-4 (January 27,
1966) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review); Letter from Walter Derenberg to
Thomas C. Brennan, Counsel for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (April
25, 1967), reprinted in 10 OMNIBus COPYRImHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1143, 1144 (G. Grossman ed. 1976). Mr. Derenberg likened this service to a situ-
ation in which a company, on a customer's request, installs an organ in a thea-
ter for the customer to use. He argued that the company that owned the organ
should not be liable because it exercised no control over the works played, not
because its actions were intermediate. Letter to Fuchs, at 4-5; Letter to Bren-
nan, at 1144.
163. Letter to Fuchs, supra note 162, at 6.
164. See id. at 7.
165. The legislative history is perhaps too confusing to accurately ascribe
precise cause and effect at this point. Derenberg's original proposal was in-
cluded in the letter to Herbert Fuchs. This letter remains unpublished, how-
ever. Nevertheless, subsequent bills reinstated the passive carrier exemption.
See, e.g., H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § ll1(a) (1) (C) (1966). Another partici-
pant in the revision process, Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights, recalled
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big common carriers in language similar to the language pro-
posed by AT&T.166
The exemption as first introduced in a 1966 bil167 was re-
tained in the 1976 Act with only one modification. In 1975, the
National Cable Television Association (NCTA) suggested sub-
stituting the phrase "any carrier" for "common carrier,"'168 the
phrase used in the 1966 bill. The NCTA noted that, in certain
situations, the services offered by a cable system are like those
offered by a traditional common carrier, such as when a cable
station leases channel space to others over whom the station
has no control. 169 But because cable systems technically are
not common carriers, 170 the NCTA argued that without the
amendment, cable systems that leased channels would never
be exempt even though their activities might be indistinguish-
able from those of AT&T.171
The statutory scheme also supports the suggestion that the
control test was intended to distinguish the activities of tradi-
tional intermediate carriers from those of cable systems. Cable
systems, as defined in section 111(f) of the Copyright Act,172
are required to pay a fixed copyright royalty under section
ll(d),173 and thus are clearly intended to fall outside the scope
of the passive carrier exemption. The control over "selection"
of primary transmissions contemplated in the exemption,
therefore, must be analogous to the kind of "selection" exer-
cised by cable systems. Consequently, if intermediate carriers
that Congress included the provision primarily to benefit AT&T. See Copyright
Issues: Cable Television and Performance Rights, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979) (statement of Barbara
Ringer) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Copyright Issues ].
166. For example, the 1966 Revision Bill exempted secondary transmissions
made by a common carrier who has no direct or indirect control over
the content or selection of the primary transmission or over the partic-
ular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose activities
with respect to the secondary transmission consist solely of providing
wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of others.
H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(a) (1) (C) (1966).
167. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(a) (1) (C) (1966).
168. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 508 (1975) (prepared statement of
Rex A. Bradley, Chairman, National Cable Television Association (NCTA))
[hereinafter cited as NCTA Amendments].
169. Id.
170. See Rules re Microwave-Served TV, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 307-08 (1976); Fron-
tier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251, 254-55 (1958).
171. See NCTA Amendments, supra note 168, at 489.
172. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (Supp. V 1981).
173. Id. § Ill(d).
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"select" in the same manner as cable stations or are otherwise
distinguishable from traditional common carriers, they must be
ineligible for the exemption if the statutory scheme is to re-
main consistent.17 4 Because carriers such as EMI generally op-
erate as intermediate services like traditional common
carriers, 75 the question presented by Eastern Microwave was
whether EMI's decision to select the WOR signal for retrans-
mission is the same kind of decision a cable system makes
when it selects a particular signal to show on one of its
channels.
When the question is posed in this manner, a good argu-
ment can be made that some intermediate carriers, like EMI,
fall outside the passive carrier exemption. By conducting a
market survey to determine the television station most pre-
ferred by its potential customers,176 EMI acted in a manner not
unlike a cable station selecting a program that would attract
the largest audience, or a television network analyzing its Niel-
sen ratings, deciding which shows to eliminate in the next tele-
vision season. The court's statement that technical necessity
compelled EMI's selection177 provides no answer. All media
are in some sense bound by such limitations. A cable system
may have only ten channels available. A television station may
broadcast on only one frequency band. How many transpon-
ders would EMI have to lease before the court would conclude
that technical necessity no longer compelled its selection?
Construing the exemption to exclude intermediate carriers
like EMI from its coverage, however, produces some anomalous
results. The copyright costs incurred by these intermediate
carriers would be passed on to cable systems, subjecting the
cable systems to royalties considerably greater than the limited
compulsory royalty Congress intended. Furthermore, the stat-
ute does not explicitly address what would happen should
cable systems attempt to avoid these passed-along costs by
performing the satellite carrier function themselves and then
arguing that the entire secondary transmission is all part of one
174. In considering one resale carrier license application, the FCC warned
that a resale common carrier "[m]ust principally serve the public rather than
its own, or closely affiliated private business interests, and must operate sub-
ject to the same common carrier restrictions concerning affiliated service, pro-
gram content origination or control, and other unlaw'ful activities." Southern
Satellite Systems, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 160 (1976).
175. See supra note 1.
176. See Eastern Microwave, 691 F.2d at 131 n.15; supra text accompanying
note 131.
177. 691 F.2d at 130.
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"cable system" so as to limit copyright liability to the amount
required by the compulsory license fee. After considering this
possibility, the Second Circuit decided that such a combined
carrier and cable system would be liable only for a single com-
pulsory royalty.178 Consequently, it concluded, subjecting a
distant signal resale carrier like EMI to copyright liability was
inconsistent with the compulsory license scheme, because the
same activities would not result in copyright liability if carried
out by a cable system.179
Statutory arguments, however, ultimately appear ill-suited
to the task of determining whether the passive carrier exemp-
tion should apply to carriers like EMI. The statute was enacted
before satellite distribution of superstation programming was
contemplated, and its drafters were concerned with striking a
balance in a market influenced by factors peculiar to that
time.180 Given the current imbalance, it seems senseless to ar-
178. Id. at 133.
179. Id. at 132 n.18. The court's conclusion that a combined carrier and
cable system would be subject only to the limited compulsory license royalty,
however, is open to question. Although it is clear that when cable systems per-
form their own terrestrial microwave relay service they need pay only the com-
pulsory license fee, this conclusion cannot be drawn so easily when satellite
relays are implicated. Terrestrial microwave transmissions over limited dis-
tances have traditionally been considered within the scope of the function of a
"cable system," and when Congress passed the 1976 Copyright Act it expected
cable systems to procure nonlocal signals via terrestrial microwave. The view
that terrestrial microwave transmissions are within the ambit of permissible
cable functions is reflected in the FCC's Cable Antenna Relay Service (CARS)
regulations which permit cable systems to own and operate their own micro-
wave transmission facilities. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 78.1-.35 (1982). No similar provi-
sions exist for satellite transmissions. How the FCC would react to cable
system ownership of transponder space is unclear. The Commission has previ-
ously conditioned its approval of resale carrier service upon there being no af-
filiation between the carrier and the recipient. See Southern Satellite Systems,
Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153, 162-63 (1976).
Other barriers make it unlikely that cable systems could ever avoid liabil-
ity in this way. The cost of leasing a transponder is probably beyond the
financial capability of any single cable franchise. See supra note 25. Further-
more, if an MSO were to lease a transponder and provide distribution to all of
its subsidiary cable systems, it would merely stand in the place of a carrier like
EMI. In other words, the MSO would operate as an intermediary performing a
"secondary transmission" within the meaning of the Act. See supra note 62
and accompanying text. In that case, an even stronger argument could b~e
made that the MSO exercised control over the selection of the transmission.
Thus, the court's conclusion is arguably correct only if a single local
franchise were to perform the entire function itself and only then if this
imagined entity could be considered a "cable system" within the meaning of 17
U.S.C. § 111(f) (Supp. V 1981).
180. In recent testimony, Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights and a ma-
jor participant in the copyright revision effort, stated:
When the new copyright law was enacted, most cable systems received
their distant signals through over-the-air reception by means of a large
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gue over the significance of who is selecting the distant signal,
when it is the importation of the signal that gives rise to the
distributive inequities in the communications market. Part II,
therefore, looks at the broad policies underlying copyright and
communications formulations to determine whether these poli-
cies support the imposition of copyright liability on distant sig-
nals in light of the current disequilibrium, and whether such
liability can justifiably be allocated to intermediate carriers in a
comprehensive secondary transmissions copyright scheme.
III. ALLOCATING COPYRIGHT LIABILITY TO
INTERMEDIATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIERS
A. COPYRIGHT AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICIES AFFECTING
DISTANT SIGNALS
Although the legislative record of the 1976 Copyright Act
reveals a concern for balancing the interests of program suppli-
ers, local television broadcasters, cable system owners, and the
viewing public,18 1 the ultimate form of that balance was shaped
by the technological and regulatory factors existing at that
time.182 In 1976, cable television was still a fledgling industry
requiring subsidized treatment to further its development. 8 3
Congress could rely on the Consensus Agreement, which it in-
corporated in the Act,184 and assume that the FCC regulations
would adequately protect program suppliers and local broad-
casters despite the imposition of only limited copyright liability
central antenna or via microwave relay. Because of the natural limita-
tions inherent in over-the-air reception and the high transmission costs
accompanying the use of microwave, distant signal carriage was lim-
ited to those distant stations within close proximity to the cable sys-
tem. These factors ensured against the oversaturation of any
particular signal's programming on a nationwide basis.
In enacting section 111(a) (3), Congress certainly did not consider
the then unanticipated activities of superstations and satellite relay
services when it exempted traditional common carriers from copyright
liability. In fact, the underlying policy reasons for compulsory licens-
ing may well be inapplicable here, since the carrier may be in the posi-
tion to act as a central agent in obtaining retransmission rights in the
relayed programming. For this reason, your subcommittee may wish to
consider an amendment limiting the scope of section 111(a)(3) to ex-
clude transmissions made to, by means of, or from a communications
satellite system.
Hearings on Copyright Issues, supra note 165, at 23.
181. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 180.
183. See supra notes 16-22, 40-52 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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on cable systems. Because these conditions have changed,
however, specific formulations of administrative and legislative
policies may be inappropriate guides to devising solutions to
current problems regarding secondary transmissions. Still,
there are a number of discernible and more general copyright
and communications policies that underlie the specific
formulations.
The prevailing policy consideration-one which underlies
fundamental copyright doctrine-is to maximize the public's
access to intellectual property while simultaneously expanding
the pool of intellectual works.185 This result is achieved by giv-
ing creators of intellectual works a limited monopoly over their
works, allowing them to extract a financial reward that ensures
that the motivation to create will be sustained. Communica-
tions policies have traditionally reflected this objective. Regu-
lations relating to television broadcasters, program suppliers,
and cable systems that protect the economic interests of each
are generally promulgated with a view toward maximizing the
range of programming.186 In nurturing this goal, the FCC has
demonstrated a preference for universal, free, local program-
ming, believing that these factors maximize viewer access and
ensure programming geared to the specific needs of the
community.187
Absent copyright liability, the proliferation of distant signal
intermediate carriers runs contrary to various tenets of these
broad copyright and communications policies. Unfettered dis-
tant signal retransmissions deprive program suppliers and local
broadcasting stations of the monetary incentive and control
over their product necessary to ensure an efficient allocation of
resources.188 Already the compulsory license scheme, with its
185. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
186. The purpose of the Communications Act of 1934, broadly stated, is "to
make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
187. See generally Josiah, supra note 5, at 17-23.
188. Congress imposed copyright liability on cable television partially be-
cause it recognized that distant signal transmission causes injury to the copy-
right owner. According to the HousE COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 47,
"retransmission of distant non-network programming by cable systems causes
damage to the copyright owner by distributing the program in an area beyond
which it has been licensed. Such retransmission adversely affects the ability of
the copyright owner to exploit the work in the distant market." Id. at 90, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5704-05.
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attendant artificially low cost of program acquisition, 89 threat-
ens to create a free-rider problem' 90 severe enough to affect
program supplier revenues and the long-term supply and diver-
sity of programming.' 9' Liability-free distant signal retransmis-
sions only exacerbate this tendency. Forcing cable systems to
internalize the costs of paying copyright royalties, on the other
hand, will produce a better relationship between the supply of
and demand for programming. A cable system will choose to
carry only those distant signals for which its subscribers are
willing to pay.
The free-rider problem is not as remote as it might seem.
Already suppliers are reluctant to license broadcasting stations
that are known to be superstations. 92 In one instance, the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association(NCAA) refused to sell
WGN-Chicago the rights to cover two college basketball games,
because satellite distribution of WGN would have undermined
the NCAA's ability to sell the games to stations in other mar-
kets. 93 Besides hindering the superstations' ability to compete
for revenues in their own marketing area, such lost purchases
could make it more difficult for the superstations to supply
their free televisions viewers with popular programming.
Rather than withhold the program from WGN, the NCAA might
simply have charged the station enough to make up for the au-
dience diversion in distant cable markets. Whether such a
practice would achieve the intended result is uncertain, how-
ever. In order to cover the increased cost, WGN would have to
increase its advertising rates. Local advertisers, indifferent to
exposure in distant markets, might not wish to pay these
higher rates. Even Ted Turner, the owner of WTBS-Atlanta,
the only superstation that actively promotes its superstation
status, 94 claims that WTBS's revenues have declined since
Southern Satellite began satellite distribution of the station.195
Besides ensuring that suppliers receive the full value of
their programming, subjecting distant signals to copyright lia-
bility injects a measure of fair competition into the industry,
helping to restore the balance that existed in 1976.196 If cable
189. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 5.
193. See supra note 5.
194. See supra note 5.
195. Perle, supra note 25, at 330-31.
196. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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systems are forced to acquire superstation programming at
prices approaching fair market value, local broadcasters, ex-
posed to increased audience fragmentation,197 will at least be
able to compete with cable stations on a more equal footing.
The establishment of a competitive programming balance
is consistent not only with the policy of encouraging viewer ac-
cess to a greater variety of programming, but also with provid-
ing access to programming that reflects local needs. Some
audience diversion, of course, is desirable. Additional program-
ming satisfies the public's demand for a greater variety of infor-
mation and entertainment. By enacting the compulsory license
scheme, Congress demonstrated its willingness to allow the
broadcast industry, in effect, to subsidize the growth of the
cable industry in order to serve the public interest.198 Given
the state of the cable industry in 1976, this course seemed wise.
Because of technical and economic limitations, terrestrial mi-
crowave transmissions could feasibly supply cable systems
only with programming from not so distant television sta-
tions.199 Thus, terrestrial transmissions allow rural television
viewers who, before the inception of cable, might have received
only one or two poor-quality over-the-air signals, to receive a
full complement of good quality signals from more distant but
still regional television stations. Similarly, terrestrial micro-
wave transmissions allow urban cable viewers to pick up the
signals of additional regional stations. Albany cable subscrib-
ers, for example, might typically receive Buffalo, Syracuse, or
New York City stations via terrestrial microwave relay. This
kind of regional signal importation forces local television sta-
tions, whether urban or rural, to compete only with those dis-
tant stations situated within their own regions. Such
competition is consistent with the FCC's long established "doc-
197. Additional programming from distant sources inevitably lures at least
some fraction of the television viewing audience away from local channels.
Even the FCC, during the cable deregulation proceedings, conceded that elimi-
nation of the distant signal and syndicated exclusivity rules would result in au-
dience losses of up to 20% for local broadcasters. Inquiry Into the Economic
Relationships Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71
F.C.C.2d 632, 660-61 (1979). The A.C. Nielsen Company Home Video Index Re-
port indicates that viewers who subscribe to cable television view local televi-
sion stations less frequently. The report states: "[T]he availability via cable of
distant signals including 'superstations' may have the greatest impact on view-
ing patterns." BROADCASTING, Nov. 24, 1980, at 46.
198. When cable systems retransmit broadcast signals, they do not incur
the costs associated with program origination and acquisition that their broad-
casting counterparts do. Thus broadcasting stations, in effect, "subsidize" cable
systems whenever their signals are retransmitted.
199. See supra note 35.
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trine of localism,"200 which conceives of a broadcast station as a
"mouthpiece" for the community, reporting events of public in-
terest, such as election results or athletic events, and stimulat-
ing discussion of local affairs. 201 Distant signal retransmission,
however, goes one step farther. It subjects broadcasting sta-
tions to competition with distant stations situated far beyond
their local areas. As a mouthpiece for the community, WGN-
Chicago offers little to its Albuquerque viewers. Therefore, dis-
tant signal retransmissions seem entirely inconsistent with the
doctrine of localism. 202
The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing is that im-
posing copyright liability on distant signals conforms to broad
copyright and communications policies. Any particular scheme
for implementing copyright liability, however, must be fash-
ioned to ensure that these policies are advanced to their fullest
extent. The proposal outlined in the next section offers a for-
mulation for allocating copyright liability for secondary trans-
missions consistent with this approach.
B. ALLOCATING COPYRIGHT LIABILBTY TO INTERMEDIATE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS IN A SECONDARY
TRANSMISSIONS COPYRIGHT SCHEME
Any copyright scheme involving secondary transmissions
should allocate copyright liability in a manner that promotes
broad copyright and communications policies. In the secon-
dary transmissions context, these policies require advancement
of the following interests: (1) the interests of program suppli-
ers in receiving compensation for their programs' full syndica-
tion values;203 (2) the interests of viewers in receiving as many
and varied programs as possible, with a special emphasis on
programs responsive to local and regional needs;204 (3) the in-
terests of television broadcasters in having cable stations pay
for programming at competitive prices.205 The following propo-
sal attempts to define a role for intermediate telecommunica-
tions carriers in a secondary transmissions copyright scheme
that allocates liability in a manner that promotes the interests
described above.
200. See generally Josiah, supra note 5, at 17-23.
201. See id. at 17.
202. See generally Josiah, supra note 5.
203. See Besen, Manning & Mitchell, supra note 99, at 92.
204. See Josiah, supra note 5, at 17-23.
205. See Note, supra note 8, at 627.
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1. Secondary Transmissions Within the Primary Transmitter's
Normal Broadcast Area
Current communications and copyright approaches to the
local secondary transmissions market, which require cable sta-
tions to carry local television signals206 and which impose no li-
ability on these retransmissions, 207 are consistent with
promoting the interests described earlier. Because television
viewers may receive a local television signal with a standard
home antenna, there is no market for miscellaneous or resale
intermediate telecommunications carriers within the local
broadcast market. Cable systems, however, by filling in gaps or
improving reception, provide a valuable service for viewers who
would otherwise be unable to receive a local television signal.
The local broadcaster's potential audience thus is not frag-
mented, but is actually enhanced, by cable system transmis-
sions within the broadcaster's local service area. The
broadcaster suffers no competitive disadvantage.208
Likewise, copyright royalties extracted by program suppli-
ers from local broadcasters will accurately reflect the market
value of the programming as enhanced by local cable retrans-
missions, because the programming is received only by viewers
clearly within the contemplation of the negotiating parties. The
current approach of not imposing any copyright liability on lo-
cal market secondary transmissions, therefore, is desirable.
2. Secondary Transmissions of Regional Signals
Importation of television signals from beyond the local tele-
vision market, yet not from truly distant sources, requires more
complex treatment. Intermediate carriers will likely use terres-
trial microwave relays to transmit these signals to a limited
number of cable stations. 209 Unlike importing more distant sig-
nals, importing these signals is likely to be consistent with the
206. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57, .59, .61 (1982).
207. Congress imposed a compulsory license fee only on signals transmitted
"beyond the local service area" of the primary transmitter. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 111(d) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981).
208. Congress clearly recognized that retransmissions of local signals by
cable systems do not threaten the local broadcaster's market. See House
COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 47, at 90, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5704.
209. Before Eastern Microwave became licensed as a resale common car-
rier, it transmitted regional signals by microwave to 200 cable system custom-
ers throughout the northeastern United States. See Eastern Microwave, Inc., 70
F.C.C.2d 2195, 2197 (1979).
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doctrine of localism, 2 10 since the programming carried on these
signals will often be responsive to regional needs. Certainly
signals imported from another city within the same state will fit
this description, as will signals drawn from cities in adjoining
states proximate to the importing city.
Importation of regional signals would also enable audi-
ences in rural areas, where broadcast signals may be weak or
nonexistent, to receive programming through a cable system.
Filling in these gaps in coverage generally will not be detrimen-
tal to program suppliers, because there is no competing syndi-
cation outlet for their programs in these rural areas, and to the
extent that advertisers are willing to pay more to the imported
television station for the value of the extra viewers, suppliers
can command higher fees. Similarly, other television stations
cannot complain about this gap filling, because the cable sys-
tems supplying coverage in these areas do not compete with
them.
Even importing regional signals into areas served by local
broadcasters will not harm program suppliers substantially.
Although, absent some copyright liability on secondary trans-
missions, program suppliers will be undercompensated for the
syndication value of their programs because of their distribu-
tion into new markets, this loss is unlikely to be great with a
regional signal. Program suppliers selling programs to a televi-
sion station that is imported into regional markets presumably
can extract higher syndication fees, because a regional station
should be able to charge advertisers somewhat more as a result
of the increased exposure. Although certain strictly local ad-
vertisers may be unwilling to pay increased advertising costs,
most advertisers would benefit from an expanded, regional au-
dience. A ski lodge in Stowe, Vermont advertising on a Bur-
lington station, for example, would presumably be willing to
pay more for advertising time that will reach Boston cable
viewers via a microwave relay. The same cannot be said, how-
ever, if the Burlington station is imported via satellite to cable
viewers in Denver. The likelihood of regional stations being
able to derive some increased revenues from local advertisers
is thus greater than in the case of national superstations.
Therefore, program suppliers to these regional stations should
be able to demand additional compensation.
Local television broadcasters competing with cable stations
carrying regional stations, however, are unlikely to derive any
210. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
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benefit from the importation of a regional station signal into
their market unless they, in turn, are imported into other re-
gional markets and draw increased advertising revenues. In
the usual situation, local broadcasters' audiences will be di-
verted to the cable station's regional programming, for which
the cable station pays nothing, absent copyright liability. In
sum, local television broadcasters, who bear full copyright lia-
bility, will be at a competitive disadvantage vis-&-vis cable sta-
tions, while program suppliers will be somewhat
undercompensated for the syndication value of their programs.
Some limited copyright liability on regional secondary trans-
missions thus seems appropriate.
Limited copyright royalties imposed on the intermediate
carrier and passed on to the cable station, or imposed directly
on the cable station, would alleviate the economic harm to pro-
gram suppliers and the artificial competitive disadvantage to lo-
cal television broadcasters. At the same time, limited liability
would grant a partial subsidy to cable stations that would en-
courage distribution of a greater range of programming, consis-
tent with the doctrine of localism, and provide rural areas with
television service drawn from the region. For limited liability
to be workable, however, transaction costs2 11 would have to be
minimized. High transaction costs, coupled with partial copy-
right royalties, could make it uneconomical for cable stations to
import any regional signals. Limited copyright liability, there-
fore, should be designed and allocated so as to minimize trans-
action costs.
A compulsory license copyright scheme has the advantage
of practically eliminating transaction costs.212 The copyright li-
censor and licensee do not negotiate over the copyrighted
work's syndication value; the licensee is automatically given
the right to use the copyrighted work, and, in return, pays a
fixed, regulated charge for this benefit.2 1 3 Because setting the
compulsory fee below the fair market price for use of the copy-
righted work creates a limited copyright liability consistent
with the desired balancing of interests in the regional signal
211. ' ransaction costs" in this context are the costs of negotiating the right
to retransmit signals carrying the copyright owner's programs. See generally
Besen, Manning & Mitchell, supra note 99, at 87 n.53.
212. See id. at 87. Proponents of the compulsory license system frequently
point to the reduced transaction costs as a major reason for perpetuating the
current scheme. See, e.g., Note, supra note 99, at 950-51. The costs of transact-
ing under compulsory licensing chiefly relate to the CRT's periodic cable roy-
alty distribution determinations. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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market described above, this form of copyright liability appears
well-suited to the retransmission of regional television signals.
Limited copyright royalties would be equally effective if as-
signed initially to intermediate carriers and then passed on to
cable stations, or if imposed directly on cable stations. Given a
compulsory license fee arrangement, however, allocating the li-
ability to cable stations appears to be preferable for two rea-
sons. First, directly imposing liability on cable operators would
result in slightly fewer transaction costs than would imposing
liability on intermediate carriers who would in turn pass on the
royalty costs. While cable operators would merely pay the fee
to an administrative agency such as the CRT, an intermediate
carrier, in addition to paying the agency, would have to allocate
this fee proportionately among the cable stations it supplied,
thus incurring the costs of another transaction. Second, the
compulsory royalty would reflect partial syndication value
more precisely if computed on the -basis of cable revenues de-
rived from subscribers, rather than on the basis of intermediate
carriers' retransmission tariffs.214 Cable revenues, because
they vary directly with the size of the cable audience, give a
more accurate picture of the lost value to program suppliers of
the preempted syndication market.
The current statutory compulsory license scheme could
serve as a model for establishing an appropriate fee computa-
tion mechanism. In considering how to define the limits of a
"regional" area for the purposes of fee computation, Congress
should consult with the FCC and others possessing expertise in
the area of communications policy.2 15 However defined, the
term should allow for the peculiarities of the regional markets
in various sections of the country. This approach is preferable
to setting a fixed radius beyond which signals are considered
"distant" rather than "regional," because it allows for consider-
214. The current compulsory license fees are computed as a percentage of a
cable system's "gross receipts." See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981).
215. In the 1976 Act Congress defined the "local service area" of a primary
transmitter with reference to the definition of that term contained within FCC
rules and regulations existing on April 15, 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (Supp. V
1981). Thus, Congress deferred to the FCC's special knowledge in the technical
area of television signal transmission and degradation. Similarly, the FCC also
appears to possess the expertise necessary to determine what constitutes a
broadcaster's and intermediate carrier's "regional" area. Congress may also
wish to follow the example of the 1976 Act, which prevents subsequent changes
in FCC regulations from affecting the definition for copyright purposes. See
HOUSE COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 47, at 99, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5714.
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ation of specific population and geographic factors.216
3. Secondary Transmissions of Distant Signals
Imposing full copyright liability on distant signal secondary
transmissions conforms to the general copyright policy of en-
suring a fair return to creators for their efforts, because full
copyright liability involves negotiations that are completely re-
sponsive to market forces.2 17 In addition, the royalty costs,
whether incurred by distant signal intermediate carriers and
passed on to cable stations or borne directly by cable stations,
would eliminate the programming subsidy cable systems now
receive through the artificially low fixed compulsory royalty
fees. 2 18 Full copyright liability would thus encourage program-
.ing distributional equity. Finally, unlike regional program-
ming, superstation programming is not responsive to local
community needs.219 Subsidizing this programming therefore
cannot be justified on the ground that it promotes localism.
A compulsory license scheme would be a poor substitute
for full copyright liability in this situation. Although a compul-
sory scheme has the advantage of minimizing transaction
costs, 220 these costs will not be great under a full liability ap-
proach if liability is initially allocated to intermediate carriers
216. For example, what is "regional" in terms of distance to a Boise, Idaho
television broadcaster may not be "regional" to a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
broadcaster. In the latter example, the markets clearly are more densely
compacted.
217. See Besen, Manning & Mitchell, supra note 99, at 90-91.
218. Although full copyright liability would eliminate the free-rider problem
whereby cable systems pay artificially low rents for programming and program
suppliers are undercompensated for the full economic value of the copyrighted
programs they control, see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text, it would
not entirely resolve cable television's competitive effects on local broadcasters'
audiences. The importation of any signal contributes to the diversion of view-
ers from local stations. But fragmentation occurs to some extent with any in-
crease in the supply of programming in a given market, be it through new local
broadcasters or new cable stations, and communications policy should not be
designed to protect the profitability of any single group. Moreover, cable sta-
tions' diversion of audiences away from local broadcasters is desirable to the
extent that such fragmentation reflects a greater variety of programming avail-
able to viewers. The real problem has not been audience diversion per se, but
rather that diversion has occurred under artificial conditions. Unlike local
broadcasters, cable stations have not had to pay the full costs of programming.
See Note, supra note 14, at 530-31. Imposing full copyright liability on distant
signal secondary transmissions alleviates this disparity and establishes distrib-
utive equity by restoring the competitive balance with respect to distant signal
programming that merely duplicates, for the most part, the programming sup-
plied by local broadcasters.
219. See generally Josiah, supra note 5.
220. See supra note 212.
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rather than cable stations. By performing as a single entity
broker,221 the costs incurred by the intermediate carrier in ne-
gotiating with individual program producers over rights to the
programs carried on the imported television station's signal
would be far less than if each cable station operator had to ne-
gotiate separately.222 Moreover, the total amount of the inter-
mediate carrier's transaction costs is unlikely to be substantial.
Home Box Office (HBO) and other pay-cable programmers, for
example, have become efficient "brokers," even though they
must negotiate for a copyright license from the copyright owner
of each motion picture or program they carry.2 23 Likewise, lo-
cal independent television stations perform such negotiations
routinely. In fact, an intermediate carrier may be able to work
with an amiable superstation to reduce transaction costs for
both of them. The distant signal intermediate carrier could ar-
range for the superstation to act as its broker and secure a
copyright license from the program supplier that would cover
both of them. The two acting together would enjoy greater lev-
erage over the program supplier than each could wield individ-
ually, resulting in savings for both.
In addition, compulsory license royalties bear little or no
relationship to the fees that open negotiations would produce.
Even if one attempted to peg fees at levels commensurate with
full liability,224 such fees would never accurately reflect market
conditions. Regulatory mechanisms can never account for the
variety of factors that enter into economic valuation in a given
instance. Furthermore, there is often a substantial lag time
before the regulatory agency can respond with necessary ad-
justments.225 Consequently, any marginal benefit received
from compulsory licensing's low transaction costs would be
221. See infra note 226.
222. The fear of high transaction costs for cable operators was one of the
reasons Congress adopted the compulsory license scheme. See supra note 70
and accompanying text. Critics of the compulsory scheme have pointed out
that the transaction costs under full copyright are largely unknown. See, e.g.,
Besen, Manning & Mitchell, supra note 99, at 86 n.52. However large such costs
may be, the contracting parties can employ standardized contracts and com-
mon purchasing agents to streamline negotiations. Id. at 87.
223. See generally Cable Programming Catches Up With Demand, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 22, 1982, at 130.
224. A recent congressional attempt to modify the compulsory license
scheme would have changed the rate structure of cable systeri royalty pay-
ments by empowering the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to establish "a just and
reasonable royalty fee." H.R. 3560, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1(c), 3 (1981). It
would appear, however, that only the marketplace can dictate what is "just and
reasonable" compensation.
225. See Note, supra note 14, at 546-47.
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more than offset by the losses to program suppliers and local
broadcasters that would result from compulsory licensing's in-
ability to reflect the true market value of program acquisition
costs.
Initially allocating full copyright liability for distant signal
retransmissions to intermediate carriers would force the carrier
to negotiate with program suppliers for the right to retransmit
signals carrying those producers' programs to distant cable sta-
tions.226 Under this scheme, the cable stations that received
such distant signals would not be subject to liability, but they
would ultimately bear the copyright costs when the intermedi-
ate carrier included these costs in its retransmission charges to
the cable stations. A potential problem with imposing full
copyright liability on distant signal intermediate carriers is that
program acquisition costs may prove too great 227 to be ab-
sorbed entirely by cable systems. If costs are too substantial to
be allocated entirely to cable systems, several situations may
develop. First, the distant signal intermediate carrier may de-
cide to share some of the royalty costs with the cable systems,
forcing the intermediate carrier to operate at a lower profit
margin if it wishes to remain in the distant signal retransmis-
sion market. In addition, the superstation itself may be willing
to subsidize some of the intermediate carrier's copyright royal-
ties. This would occur, however, only if the television station
were actively pursuing superstation status,2 28 and had decided
226. In the current industry structure, the intermediate carriers that would
likely be affected under the full copyright liability scheme are the approxi-
mately half dozen satellite resale carriers. See Competitive Carrier Rulemak-
ing, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 320-21 & n.18 (1979); supra note 1. These entities lease
satellite transponder facilities and transmit distant television signals to as
many as 1400 cable stations nationwide. See, e.g., WGN Continental Broadcast-
ig Co. v. United Video, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 403, 405 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d
622 (7th Cir. 1982). Owners of terrestrial microwave facilities would typically
not fall into the distant signal group, because they tend to operate only region-
ally. See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d at 321. Some intermedi-
ate carriers, such as Eastern Microwave, Inc. (EMI), transmit both regional and
distant signals. See supra note 209. Under the proposed copyright scheme, a
carrier like EMI that supplied a signal such as WOR-New York, to both regional
and distant cable stations would negotiate with WOR-TV's program suppliers
only for the right to retransmit the programs to distant cable stations.
227. See Note, supra note 99, at 950.
228. Of the television stations now being transmitted by satellite resale car-
riers, only WTBS-Atlanta is a willing participant. See supra note 5.
In the usual contract between a program supplier and the broadcasting sta-
tion, the station purchases the exclusive license to broadcast the supplier's pro-
gramming for a specified time period within a certain geographic area. See, e.g.,
Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683, 703 (1965). If full copyright lia-
bility were imposed on intermediate carriers, the carriers would have to
purchase clearance from the entity owning the rights to grant or deny pernis-
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that increased revenues from nonlocal advertisers would more
than offset the cost of underwriting the secondary transmission
and would enable it to develop its own "network"
programming.
Of course, if the costs of full copyright liability proved to be
too great even after an attempt at negotiated allocation among
the parties, then the distribution of distant signal programming
would cease. With willing participants, however, total costs are
unlikely ever to reach this level. First, program suppliers are
unlikely to demand copyright royalties at prices that would
foreclose them from such potentially lucrative markets. Since
the suppliers' costs are fixed once programs have been pro-
duced, any additional revenue will increase the profitability of
their investment. Only the availability of a better return from a
competitor in the markets in which the superstation is to be
transmitted would prevent suppliers from syndicating their
programs through distant signal intermediate carriers. The
transaction costs involved in negotiating with television sta-
tions in the local broadcast markets that compete with the in-
termediate carrier-supplied cable stations, however, would
almost always be prohibitive. For example, when the interme-
diate carrier negotiates with the producers of a program carried
on the superstation, a single negotiation takes place for the
right to distribute the program to each of the cable stations it
supplies. If the syndicators of the program attempted to negoti-
sion to use the programming before it could make secondary transmissions. A
station actively pursuing superstation status would likely purchase the right to
authorize secondary transmissions in each of its exclusive license contracts
with program suppliers, thus allowing it to provide the intermediate carrier
with a continuous stream of programming, pass along its program acquisition
costs, and add a reasonable amount for profit.
A hostile or indifferent superstation could purchase distant signal rights
and withhold retransmission consent to the intermediate carrier or simply not
purchase the right to authorize consent. In the latter situation, the intermedi-
ate carrier could cure the problem by dealing directly with the program sup-
plier. In the former situation, the carrier would have to delete the
programming for which it had not received clearance and either substitute
other programming or leave a gap in the transmission. This latter situation
should occur only rarely, if at all. To be able to withhold consent, the broad-
casting station would first have to purchase that right from the program sup-
plier for an amount greater than that which the carrier would be willing to pay
for the right to receive the programming. It is hard to imagine a broadcasting
station ever having a financial stake in preventing retransmissions to distant
markets, since it would never find itself in competition with the cable stations
that ultimately receive the transmissions. Thus, the only problem to intermedi-
ate carriers posed by the hostile superstation under a full copyright liability
system is the one suggested in the text-the superstation's unwillingness to
subsidize some of the intermediate carrier's royalty costs in order to ensure
that retransmissions to cable stations occur.
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ate with competitors of the intermediate carrier-supplied cable
stations in each of these markets for local exclusive rights,
however, the transaction costs would be extremely high. Thus,
it is unlikely that program suppliers would ever charge royal-
ties that would foreclose them from the intermediate carrier
market.
At the worst, excessive charges or wholesale denials of con-
sent229 by program suppliers would eliminate the distribution
of superstation programming. This result, however, in the long
run would not significantly hamper either the growth of the
cable industry or its ability to meet the public demand for pro-
gramming. Apart from a heavy dose of sports events, the kinds
of programming that WTBS, WGN and WOR carry do not differ
from what is already available to cable subscribers on other in-
dependent stations. Furthermore, pay-cable provides an ample
supply and variety of offerings.2 30 Cable growth will slacken, if
at all, only because of increased competition from even newer,
more revolutionary media, such as subscription television
(STV), multipoint distribution service (MDS), low-power tele-
vision (LPTV), and direct broadcast satellites (DBS), all of
which function within the traditional program acquisition mar-
229. Although massive denials of consent are unlikely for the reasons set
out in the text, there are a few situations in which a program supplier might
wish to restrict access to a particular copyrighted work. Promoters of heavy-
weight boxing title bouts or other special sporting events, for example, have
frequently limited access to coverage of these events to a few, select media out-
lets. See Ladd, supra note 29, at 35-37. Presumably, sports promoters will re-
strict access if they can obtain a greater profit by charging higher royalty fees
to a few outlets than by charging the usual lower fee to many commercial tele-
vision outlets. Even in this situation, however, secondary transmissions by in-
termediate carriers to cable systems may actually further the goals of profit-
minded program suppliers. Cable systems served by intermediate carriers can
easily make especially attractive programming available to only those subscrib-
ers willing to pay an additional one-time surcharge beyond the subscribers' ba-
sic monthly service fee. See id. at 33. Since some or all of the enhanced cable
revenues would be extracted by sports promoters in the retransmission con-
sent negotiations, sports promoters would still accomplish their goal of restrict-
ing access while increasing revenues. Therefore, sports promoters might
actually seek out superstation transmissions.
If, for some unforseen reason, a program supplier actually withholds re-
transmission consent for a particular program, the intermediate carrier would
either have to find substitute programming or leave a gap in its retransmission
of the superstation signal. This problem is not insurmountable, however. The
carrier could simply contract in advance for the rights to another program
owned by the broadcasting station or a different program supplier, and show
that program in place of the deleted one. At worst, the carrier might have to
leave a gap in its service.
230. See supra note 92.
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ket.231 Finally, recent data suggest that cable systems no
longer rely as heavily as they once did on distant broadcast sig-
nals to attract cable subscribers.232
IV. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of distant signal television programming
via intermediate telecommunications carriers is one of several
factors that has contributed to the current imbalance among
the interests of program suppliers, local television broadcast-
ers, and cable systems in the telecommunications market. The
present copyright statute is ill-equipped to respond to this
problem, however, because it was designed and has been inter-
preted to establish an equilibrium in the broadcasting industry
based on conditions that existed in 1976. This Note has consid-
ered the appropriate role for intermediate telecommunications
carriers in the secondary transmissions market and has con-
cluded that initially assigning intermediate carriers full copy-
right liability for importing distant signals conforms to broad
copyright and communications policies. Initially allocating full
copyright liability to distant signal intermediate carriers mini-
mizes transaction costs, while partially redressing the current
market imbalance by forcing cable systems ultimately to bear
the cost of distant signal programming at levels commensurate
with its fair market value. Although some dislocation in the
supply of distant signal programming might result, imposing
full copyright liability on distant signal intermediate carriers
would effect a more equitable distribution of programming and
allocation of its costs.
231. For a description of these new media, see generally Holsendolph,
supra note 87.
232. See Ladd, supra note 29, at 29. An A.C. Nielsen Company report indi-
cates that subscriber viewing of pay-cable advertiser supported programming
exceeded viewing of distant independent television stations in July 1980, No-
vember 1980, and February 1981 by 3.2%, 1.7%, and 3%, respectively. Id.
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